Results 2,661-2,680 of 7,082 for speaker:John Paul Phelan
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Well, the basic premise ... that was the last item listed. The first item was a holiday, the second was consumer goods. You know, there was a lot of things included there which, I think, people now looking back on would think were not suitable for that type of product, if you know what I mean, not ... whatever about extensions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay. Again, I want to change to the issue of remuneration and, I think, on page 5 of your statement you said: "I do not believe that the remuneration arrangements led to a culture of excessive risk taking given the checks and balances with the overall credit approval system." So, were bonuses - I maybe misunderstood your statement - were bonuses paid on the basis of profits made through...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay, but they would-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Yes, at lower levels.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: They weren't linked to profitability in the sense that, you know, if a mortgage is sold, which is a 30-year mortgage, there was no sense of clawback on a bonus that it wouldn't be realised in full or it could be clawed back if the product or the loan proved, ultimately, to be profitable?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay. Finally, your strategy as a group was to focus on the domestic Irish mortgage market which you were ... and, I don't know, perhaps, still are one of the, you know, the largest lender. Was there ever any effort during your time as chief executive to diversify? You mentioned, I think, in your statement again that you felt you didn't have the necessary skill set to be looking to SMEs...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: So you decided to focus on what you thought was your-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Thank you Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Fingleton. Firstly, can I ask you in relation to the Irish Nationwide annual report from 2007? It shows that in the period 2002 to 2007, profit before tax increased by 303% and total assets by 190%. It is document B02, IBRC00678-002. I don't think you are allowed to show. It is the annual report from 2007 of Nationwide, showing that tax ... profit...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Yes, and assets by 190%. This was at a time where you said in your opening statement that there was increased competition in the Irish lending market. Do you think ... the question really is: do you think that level of increase was sustainable in the context of that increasing level of competition in the Irish market at that period of time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: And why wasn't there any action taken to ensure a more sustainable level of growth?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay. Can I ask, in your opinion did those levels of growth indicate that the pursuit of growth was affecting credit quality and lending standards within the institution in those years, 2002 to 2007?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Can I ask you, then, in relation to an article that was published inThe Sunday Business Post, 23 June 2013?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Yes, 23 June 2013. It cited a report compiled by KPMG into Irish Nationwide where it said that 15% of all residential mortgages issued in 2006, which amounted to €111 million, were to just 39 clients who borrowed on average €2.8 million each for the 39 of them. How was that situation allowed to happen? Was that not an over-concentration of the risk from the point of view of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Can I ask-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Would many of those 39, from your recollection, those 39 loans of an average of €2.9 million each, have been initiated through you personally, do you have any recollection?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: You refer to it as a myth yourself, Mr. Fingleton, but it was a widely held view. I used to work in financial services before I became a public representative and a view did exist that you were Irish Nationwide Building Society and that you, more than perhaps any other financial institution operating in the Irish market, had, and I think you indicated this in your opening comments to Deputy...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: -----a particular knowledge of individual loans and exposures that existed. Is that not the case? Is it not borne out by several of the letters from the regulator, in particular, which showed a concentration of power, if you like, in your office?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Okay, but did that not also stem then from the fact - Deputy O'Donnell asked earlier about the fact - that your board was smaller that virtually every other institution?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
John Paul Phelan: Can I ask, then, in relation to the document I referenced earlier, Vol. 1, page 3, the letter from the regulator from 9 December 2004, first paragraph, "High-level concerns"? You spoke earlier on that there weren't many high-level concerns but this was one on the issue of corporate governance, where it says: "As you are aware", it was addressed to you: "Dear Michael", the Financial Regulator-----