Results 26,501-26,520 of 35,959 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor Honohan has picked me up wrong. I never said that Mr. O'Connell was director at the time when DEPFA went bust.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: He was director up to 2007 until Hypo Real Estate bought DEPFA out. As Professor Honohan has acknowledged, the damage was done in the period leading up to 2007. My point was about the relationship. For example, it has been reported extensively that DEPFA Bank - the German bank at that time - in 2001 lobbied the Government in terms of the Asset Covered Securities Act which was introduced...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The bank then reconstituted itself as an Irish bank as the Act was passed. It was the first to involve itself in that type of issuance.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: It was followed by the Bank of Ireland and the Anglo Irish Bank. That move allowed for cheap credit to enter the market and allowed triple-A banking in banks that were not triple-A rated. My question is on that nexus. I refer to the relationship where somebody is a director of a bank but was one of the most senior people in the Department of Finance, was the Governor of the Central Bank,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Does Professor Honohan believe it was the Government's view there should be a non-intrusive environment in terms of regulation in the IFSC?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I asked about the Government's policy. Does Professor Honohan believe that it was Government policy to have a non-intrusive environment in terms of the IFSC and its promotion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor, on page 109 of your report you write that "A non-intrusive regulatory environment conducive to promoting the IFSC was considered important by Government". How do you make that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: It is not, with respect Professor Honohan, about catching you out. I am asking why because in your report there seem to be contradictions.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The question is this and maybe Professor Honohan could clarify-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Which is the accurate version? Was it Government policy to have a non-intrusive regulatory environment? This is important. It is mentioned in your report and in other reports that the regulation that was applied to the IFSC had to be applied to other banks. So, for example, as I mentioned, the DEPFA Bill as it is colloquially called, or the Asset Covered Securities Act, which was amended...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The last point I want to make is about moral suasion. You mention on page 97 of your report that the Financial Regulator had access to increasing capital requirements and moral suasion. I would like you to talk to us about what you mean by moral suasion. What do you mean in regard to appealing to the morality of Irish banks? I want you to answer that in the context of what we know...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: One of the elements missing, apart from increasing capital requirements and applying moral suasion, which was not working, is credit controls. The Chairman mentioned this earlier. Applying the credit control rules - which you acknowledge existed but which were completely avoided - would have had a major impact in terms of commercial property lending and house lending. Why was that not...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Can I just ask one more question? I appreciate that those measures can be got around, as you have said in terms of the 1970s and 1980s, but if we look at Anglo Irish Bank, for example, its lending was in commercial property. There was a massive concentration on commercial property. If we had applied the rules on credit limits would it not have been next to impossible to get around those...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: With others, the Governor has taken up the issue of my question in terms of being hooked on one issue. I am sure Professor Honohan understands that is very important the information he gives to the committee is evidence and the question I had and what he gave earlier on was that there was no policy of non-intrusive regulation. He has retracted that, which I welcome, but it is not about...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, when I am finished with the question. There are two things I want to bring up. One is in relation to the phone calls with the ECB. Can the Governor elaborate on that and the Trichet phone call in particular? Was there a phone call between Trichet and the Minister, Brian Lenihan, as the latter said publicly in the RTE documentary, where he left a voicemail on Saturday the 27th, which...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Therefore, there would be a cost to the State. If the Governor is suggesting that what David Doyle has said is that this is with capital, it is not a suggestion for the first time that this was not a simple liquidity crisis, but was rather an issue of capital. It was a recognition on 26 September that there was a need for capital injections in the banks.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: If memory serves me, the Governor says that when he spoke to Mr. Doyle, his concept was that it was with capital, not after capital.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Quite a large number of people attended that meeting including those from the NTMA, the Department of Finance, Merrill Lynch, the financial regulator's office, and the Central Bank. Were any of those people spoken to in relation to Mr. Doyle's suggestion that the minute of that meeting was inaccurate and that he did not suggest there were losses of that nature in either of the banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What about the ECB phone call and voicemail?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Has the Governor asked Trichet, with whom he served on the ECB?