Results 26,061-26,080 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In an article published in The Sunday Business Poston 20 January 2008 Mr. McWilliams wrote: A few years ago, one of Ireland's best known bankers indicated to me just how important it was that the Irish banks remained Irish-run in a downtown. His nightmare scenario was an Irish property market slump, coincident with a change of management in Ireland's major banks. In a crisis, he envisaged...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Is it reasonable or not to say that the elements of the scenario that were outlined by the banker in 2005 to Mr. McWilliams appeared in the response in 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The banker suggested, at that time, that there would be "a type of financial war-cabinet, where bankers would have a direct line to the Minister for Finance."

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I shall ask a final question but I will get a chance to comment later. Mr. McWilliams has provided the committee with extensive evidence in the form of documentaries and written material that he had written from the period 2008 which foretold the financial crisis. If it was as obvious as he has said, why was it ignored by what he called the insiders?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. McWilliams mentioned that this was obvious to anybody that was trained, which is important. I want to take Mr. McWilliams through 28 January 2008. His former employer, UBS, had issued a recommendation at that time. It issued a sell recommendation on AIB and Anglo Irish Bank as a result of mounting fears that they might suffer a rise in bad debts due to their exposure to falling...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: It is the factual note. Ian Keogh reported on 24 February that within two hours of this call being made, 34% of the value of the Irish banks was stripped away. Mr. McWilliams said that this was obvious to anyone who was trained. What information did UBS have to be able to make such a strong recommendation on AIB and Anglo Irish Bank that the Department of Finance, the Regulator, the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. McWilliams said it was obvious to the trained eye.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Even at this stage, could any excuses be made for those in the institutions and the Department who were trained but who did not find it obvious and did not see it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In an article of 25 May 2008, Mr. McWilliams wrote: The boom in Ireland was little more than a scam. Ireland was the victim of a financial coup d’etatwhereby a cabal of the banks and developers, with the blessing of the Government and cheer-led by various vested interests who were getting their grubby cut, took over our economy. Does Mr. McWilliams stand by this statement and, if...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: My specific question was how Mr. McWilliams can say definitively that the Irish Government supported this financial coup d’etatby the bankers and developers. What is the evidence to back up the statement?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor Edward Kane gave evidence to this inquiry earlier in the year. He had said in a 2004 paper that, while policy making during a crisis may be of the seat-of-the-pants variety, the policy itself is informed by a political and economic struggle over who pays for the losses. What is Professor McDonough's opinion of that statement? Does he agree or disagree with his assessment of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What were the political and economic power blocs at play in the context of the Irish crisis?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In an article of 2010 entitled "The Irish Crash in Global Context" Professor McDonough stated that financialisation was facilitated by the neoliberal push for deregulation. This committee has heard evidence relating to the deregulation of the banks and the impact that had on the banking crisis. Can he explain why, in his view, there was a push for deregulation? What purpose does...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: We have discussed light-touch regulation and deregulation in the past and Professor McDonough has given testimony on the subject of the amounts of money going through the IFSC. Do we have light-touch regulation of the IFSC now or is it a thing of the past?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In the context of the IFSC, are the ingredients of the perfect storm, to which Professor McDonough referred earlier, still there or have they disappeared?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yesterday, Professor Gregory Connor came before the committee and he said: ...a misunderstanding of the big risk of systemic liquidity problems in the banking sector. That was also missed. As such, the economists share some blame. Would Professor McDonough agree or disagree with Professor Connor's statement that there was a misunderstanding of systemic liquidity problems and, if so, why...

Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform: Draft Heads of Finance (Tax Appeals Commission) Bill: Discussion (Resumed) (25 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I wish to delve into this figure issue further. It seems that this was the motivator for the witnesses' request to address the committee. I would like Mr. O'Callaghan to clarify for the committee a statement which was given by Mr. O'Leary. Mr. O'Callaghan takes issue with the statement and the impression which was given. Mr. O'Callaghan states that Mr. O'Leary's statement gave the...

Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform: Draft Heads of Finance (Tax Appeals Commission) Bill: Discussion (Resumed) (25 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What about the Circuit Court?

Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform: Draft Heads of Finance (Tax Appeals Commission) Bill: Discussion (Resumed) (25 Feb 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Where would the figure come from? I presume the Department has not plucked the figure of 600 from the sky. Given the fact that the Office of the Appeal Commissioners had been in correspondence with the Department last year telling it not to use these figures, why would the Department come before this committee and state something that the commissioners have refuted?