Results 25,741-25,760 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: In terms of the number of investors, if we take it that the figure of 158 transactions is accurate, how many individuals or syndicates would we be talking about for that number of transactions? Is it the same type of proportion?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: From Ms Hunt's experience was there much crossover from the 50 or 60 Irish investors that year with the investors investing in the UK?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: That is fair enough. When did the downturn in the UK commercial property market begin?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Was Ms Hunt concerned at all about the exposure of Irish commercial property speculators to a UK downturn?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is Ms Hunt aware of the UBS investment report in January 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The UBS investment report was the report that led to a 30% share price fall in some Irish banks overnight. The newspaper reports from that time indicated that the report issued warnings in regard to Ireland's commercial property sector. It states:We believe that the risk to the value of retail shopping centre space in Ireland is on the down side in the near to medium term due to three...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It was in January 2008.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: To help Ms Hunt, the report put forward a sell recommendation for both AIB and Anglo Irish Bank to its investors. Obviously, that was to those who sign up to its reports, and it predicted a 30% fall in Irish commercial property prices.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. The report was rubbished by CBRE in its March 2008 bi-monthly report, which Ms Hunt said in her evidence is the best known report. It states:... we fundamentally disagree with flawed analysis issued by UBS in recent weeks which suggested that total returns in the Irish commercial property market have the potential to decline by 30%. Unlike the UK market, where institutions...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Ms Hunt is also quoted as stating: "While economic and property market fundamentals are still basically sound, the big issue in most sectors is the scarcity and cost of debt-funding."
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Who does UBS issue its reports to? What type of individuals would be reading UBS reports?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The UBS report suggested a 30% decline in property prices and CBRE claimed that was flawed and fundamentally disagreed with the analysis. What was the decline in Irish property prices from peak to trough?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: When Ms Hunt says no one could have anticipated it, I put it to her that UBS issued a report to its investor clients to sell on AIB and Anglo Irish Bank because of the concentration of lending and because they believed commercial property prices were going to drop by 30%, which her firm said was fundamentally flawed. Is it not the case that UBS and others saw a decline in the commercial...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The UBS report was based not on residential but on commercial property. The sell recommendation for AIB and Anglo Irish Bank was because of their exposure to that sector. In March 2008 Fitch downgraded its ratings for Irish Nationwide Building Society, citing the bank's high exposure to a small number of commercial property developers. Did Ms Hunt take any cognisance of that report or...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It was March 2008, at the same time as CBRE was saying that the economic and property market fundamentals were sound.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did CBRE pay any attention to the Fitch report? Did it take on board the fact that Fitch had said in the document: "International credit rating agency Fitch last month downgraded its rating of INBS, citing concerns over the outlook of property in Ireland and Britain and the society's high exposure to a small number of heavyweight lending customers."
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: With the benefit of hindsight, does Ms Hunt believe that analysis was flawed?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is CBRE not the expert on commercial property?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I want to return to the "Future Shock" issue. Can we agree that the housing market and banking are not within Ms Hunt's core areas of expertise? These are core areas. Ms Hunt mentioned that the programme covered three issues she disagreed with, foreign direct investment, FDI, the construction downturn and interest rates. Can we also agree that in her press release, which...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (2 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I understand that and Ms Hunt has made that clear. In her statement, which described the programme as irresponsible journalism, dramatic and incorrect predictions, technically incorrect and so on and so forth - there is quite a bit of interesting language in the statement - she addressed her concerns only to the housing market.