Results 25,421-25,440 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Now we heard evidence last week-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: That this was in relation to Anglo and Nationwide. But I put it to you, that you left that meeting believing that Anglo and Nationwide was not going to be guaranteed, so that statement couldn't have referred to those two institutions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, and welcome, fáilte, Mr. Duffy, chuig an coiste. Mr. Duffy, we've been privileged to have a number of bankers before the committee in the last number of days and each of them have apologised to the Irish people for the mistakes that were made in your bank. As the previous speaker had indicated, you're probably best positioned, as somebody who came...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I ask you in relation to the global liquidity - because this has come up in evidence - and the crisis at that time; if there wasn't a global liquidity crisis at that time, would AIB still have lost ... well, we know it's well in excess of €20 billion, but would it still have cost the taxpayer €20 billion?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, and I'll come to some of those points. But it's been suggested again before the inquiry, and the suggestion goes something like this, that the global liquidity crisis actually could have saved this State money in the long term because there was no indication that the banks were going to stop their concentration into the property and development and commercial property sectors. Do you...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Basically, the suggestion is, is that there was no ... there didn't seem to be a let-up from the banks of investing into concentrated areas such as commercial property, development property, and that what the global financial crisis brought on was basically a realisation that assets were overvalued and would eventually have to be written down.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: As a banker, Mr Duffy ... we know that AIB were beginning to breach the standards of concentration limits in 2006. We've also been told that this was being worked out with the regulator and that this process may change in the future, but, as a banker, with the interest of your shareholders and that concern as one of your core priorities, is it prudent to go above the limits that were in...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: In your opinion, what was the main weakness in the bank's risk appetite process prior to 2011?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The liquidity issues.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And, in your opinion, Mr. Duffy, why weren't those issues addressed by the incumbent management?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is it obvious to you that those issues were serious issues, if you were in that position? Would it be obvious to a banker that they were serious position ... serious issues?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What is your view in relation to the challenge presented by the risk function to lending strategies? Were they sufficiently strong in the period leading up to the crisis in 2011?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, in the revised 2002 EU restructuring plan and it's on AIB B1, Vol. 2, pages 39-40, I won't read the whole paragraph but, it says: "AIB acknowledges that its decision to expand into property was misguided and that's its risk management and internal government systems were not as effective as they should have been in controlling that risk." Do you believe, Mr. Duffy, that is a fair...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And can you further... you are of the view that AIB now has the appropriate structures and controls in place to ensure that we are not seeing a repeat of that type of scenario.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: In relation to your opening statement on page 3, paragraph 7, you say that the large exposures and approval authorities policy "replaced the previous Group Large Exposure Policy." Can you tell the committee why you replaced the group large exposure policy?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Thanks Mr. Duffy, we know from... again evidence that has been provided to the committee in relation to the transfers from AIB and other institutions to NAMA, that the vast majority of the sum total of that money came from a small number of borrowers. And AIB is no different in this regard, did you see any issue with the group large exposure policy as contributing to the loss that AIB...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, the ... again in your opening statement, you talk about the need for continuous oversight saying that: "The recent history of the banking sector has required that this process is predominantly evidence based for both potential and conduct of business regulations - banks must not only comply with what the regulations require, they must also continuously evidence that compliance." How...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. I am not sure if you have followed the proceedings so far, we have had contributors from NAMA in, which talked about, and there has been quite a bit of discussion at the committee in relation to loan-to-value ratios and what were the real loan-to-value rations that were being offered. The suggestion has been made in many cases that the loan to value were 100%. I want to put to you...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, in relation to NAMA and I know you mentioned NAMA bonds on page 7 of your statement in paragraph 3, and I am also aware that you weren't at AIB at the time of the transfer of the loans to NAMA, but you were there while AIB held the NAMA bonds. Can you tell the committee for what purpose did AIB use the NAMA bonds? How did they work? What were the steps involved?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: How important for your bank was it that the NAMA bonds became available to AIB to access that liquidity?