Results 25,401-25,420 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What is your view in relation to the challenge presented by the risk function to lending strategies? Were they sufficiently strong in the period leading up to the crisis in 2011?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, in the revised 2002 EU restructuring plan and it's on AIB B1, Vol. 2, pages 39-40, I won't read the whole paragraph but, it says: "AIB acknowledges that its decision to expand into property was misguided and that's its risk management and internal government systems were not as effective as they should have been in controlling that risk." Do you believe, Mr. Duffy, that is a fair...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And can you further... you are of the view that AIB now has the appropriate structures and controls in place to ensure that we are not seeing a repeat of that type of scenario.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In relation to your opening statement on page 3, paragraph 7, you say that the large exposures and approval authorities policy "replaced the previous Group Large Exposure Policy." Can you tell the committee why you replaced the group large exposure policy?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Thanks Mr. Duffy, we know from... again evidence that has been provided to the committee in relation to the transfers from AIB and other institutions to NAMA, that the vast majority of the sum total of that money came from a small number of borrowers. And AIB is no different in this regard, did you see any issue with the group large exposure policy as contributing to the loss that AIB...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, the ... again in your opening statement, you talk about the need for continuous oversight saying that: "The recent history of the banking sector has required that this process is predominantly evidence based for both potential and conduct of business regulations - banks must not only comply with what the regulations require, they must also continuously evidence that compliance." How...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. I am not sure if you have followed the proceedings so far, we have had contributors from NAMA in, which talked about, and there has been quite a bit of discussion at the committee in relation to loan-to-value ratios and what were the real loan-to-value rations that were being offered. The suggestion has been made in many cases that the loan to value were 100%. I want to put to you...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, in relation to NAMA and I know you mentioned NAMA bonds on page 7 of your statement in paragraph 3, and I am also aware that you weren't at AIB at the time of the transfer of the loans to NAMA, but you were there while AIB held the NAMA bonds. Can you tell the committee for what purpose did AIB use the NAMA bonds? How did they work? What were the steps involved?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: How important for your bank was it that the NAMA bonds became available to AIB to access that liquidity?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Duffy, you weren't obviously at AIB; indeed ,you weren't in the country at the time of the bank guarantee. You mention in your opening statement you were born and educated here, you worked as CEO for Standard Bank International. I'm aware that that was a Standard Bank plc who we might recall in 2009 suggested that Ireland and Greece would end up going into a bailout by the end of...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: That's an important point that you make there in terms of asset bubbles. Did any alarm bells go off with you in that period of 2005 up to 2008 that the banks were often lending into a concentrated sector, that we were in the middle of a property bubble or any of those observations or others?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I am aware of the commentary but I'm interested in your own views in relation to this here. In terms of an asset bubble, did you believe prior to 2008, prior to the guarantee, that there was an asset bubble in Ireland?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Finally, on the last issue I want to just raise with you, we had earlier on, one of your former colleagues, Mr. Sheehy, before the committee. We've talked to him about his memo that he dictated on the 2 October 2008 in relation to the night of the guarantee. In that there's a reference to a draft Government guarantee, which he says, "copy attached". He informed the committee that that memo...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Did the bank ... during your time did the bank carry out any review in relation to the issues that led up to the bank nearly becoming nationalised with the State taking a majority shareholder, 99%? Did the board or did yourself commission any study in relation to this?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat. Mr. Duffy, we were talking about asset bubbles earlier on and concentration of lending into a certain area which had an asset bubble. Do you believe that there's a property bubble under way at this point in time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Now, if we just take Dublin alone, and you mentioned the Central Bank's measures, which dampened house prices for three of the last five months, house prices have again began to increase, as we see from the CSO, at 1.1% in the last month, with a 22.8% increase over the last 12 months. If that were to be repeated in the next year, house prices in Dublin would exceed where they were in 2005....

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, because a bubble can be caused by a number of reasons, am I correct in saying that? It can be in the past caused by credit, or in the future caused by, or in the present caused by lack of supply. And to take me onto that question you mentioned about the interaction that AIB is having with six developers. I think you've mentioned last July that you were looking to fund 5,000 houses in...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And you talk about the confidence that the public needs to have in the institution, and your institution serves the public. I know you haven't released names of the developers and I'm not expecting you to release names of the six developers that you are, I think, talking about between €500 million and €1 billion of funding to be made available, but are you concerned that there...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, in your opening-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Sorry? Yes, yes, well that was kind of looking forward for how do we prevent what's happened in the past. But in relation to your opening statement you talk about the need to deleverage to meet the newly-proposed Basel III ratios and also the demands of the Troika. How has AIB deleveraged its loan portfolio, and can you give us a sense of the type of loans that AIB deleveraged? In your...