Results 25,381-25,400 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But did you express the view that the two institutions that I mentioned, namely, Anglo and Nationwide, did not warrant the statement that they were solvent?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat a chathaoirligh agus cuirim fáilte roimh iar-cheannaire an ECB chuig Baile Átha Cliath, an t-Uasal Trichet. Mr. Trichet, you said in your opening statement that the ECB had no responsibility at all for bank supervision or macro-prudential policies in member states, so, therefore, can you confirm that when the Irish financial stability reports were issued between...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Institute of International and European Affairs
Governance of the ECB: Past, Present and Future (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Trichet, you make the point that ... you pointed the finger to try and point out some of these issues and it's clear that the record will show that you yourself, as President of the ECB, had been warning as far back as 2005 in relation to the real estate prices and also the lending into construction. I would ask for your views in relation to the actions that were taken at a...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: No, it's a briefing document.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, agus cuirim fáilte roimh an bheirt chuig an coiste fiosrúcháin. Can I just ask you, to start off with, Mr. Sheehy, to your knowledge, was there a practice of restructuring criticised loans, you know, for example, agreeing to moratoriums, interest-only, interest roll-up or extensions in the terms and conditions in the period of 2006 to 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: That's fair enough. In normal times it's standard practice in banking to do this. In relation to that period, 2006 and 2008, did you see an increase of the type of restructuring in the way that I've outlined for large property ... commercial property exposures?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And would this ... by restructuring the loans, would this put these loans ... would they move them from a category of criticised to uncriticised loans?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: That's not the question. Which ... by doing this, by rolling up interest, by restructuring them, does it move it from a category of criticised loan to a performing loan?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But it moves them-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But it moves them out of criticised.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes. Okay. In-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. In relation to the position of your bank in the run up to September ... or during September 2008, the liquidity pressures that institutions were facing, but in particular AIB ... did the liquidity pressure for AIB ease during the second part of September 2008 or did it further tighten?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But from the 15th, liquidity starting to tighten. Is that your evidence?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. The reason I ask you that is ... and I reference Vol. 2, AIB, C3b as core documents here, and we're on page 50. In the minutes of the board meeting that was held in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, it's reported ... and you reported your interactions with the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator since 7 September. This meeting took place on the 17th, so two days after you report that...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The point I'm making is, the minutes reflect, is that if pressures ... liquidity pressures didn't ease, you would breach liquidity ratios by the end of October.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, if they didn't ease. You have informed the committee that liquidity pressures didn't ease, indeed what happened after this meeting is they tightened. So the question I put to you is, was AIB facing a seriously liquidity problem in October or after that point?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But you also say in these notes that this matter would be pursued at a political level. This is how serious the matter obviously was being reflected at the board meeting.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, so two weeks later you had, or within two weeks you had the meeting with the Taoiseach and the finance Minister looking for a guarantee for your bank and three others.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, the notes ... the memo that you took on 2 October, is there any reason for this committee not to judge them as true and accurate reflections of what happened on those nights?