Results 25,381-25,400 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay and we had drawn up an alternative form, and again the alternative form is not available to anybody at this point in time either.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And in relation to the point where, I think it was the fourth interaction, which was the bilaterals, you say that:there were also issues in the Government's draft which we were uneasy about relating to the attestations by the Financial Regulator that the system was solvent and that all banks were solvent. We felt that there was clearly a risk in this statement. Subsequently the Government...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Verbal?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes that's quite interesting, because you say it now, and I'll point out the point that you say that it was the Government's draft that you were uneasy with and not verbal communication but that has just been noted. You say ... you give a reason why you were uneasy with the statement of solvency and you said that "if market participants purchased shares in companies, once the guarantee was...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you believe it was un-factual to say that these were-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But Mr. Sheehy ... Mr. Sheehy, when you left that meeting, and correct me if I am wrong, but from the evidence we have heard, when you left that meeting and when you asked for the insolvent ... the statement of solvency of the institutions to be deleted, that you believed that you were only referring to four institutions that were going to be guaranteed by the Government. And the question I...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You say in this memo again-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I'll finish now. You say that the reason that you wanted this deleted was that, if company ... participants purchased shares in companies, once the guarantee was issued and it subsequently transpired that these companies were not as strong as contended.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Now we heard evidence last week-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: That this was in relation to Anglo and Nationwide. But I put it to you, that you left that meeting believing that Anglo and Nationwide was not going to be guaranteed, so that statement couldn't have referred to those two institutions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, and welcome, fáilte, Mr. Duffy, chuig an coiste. Mr. Duffy, we've been privileged to have a number of bankers before the committee in the last number of days and each of them have apologised to the Irish people for the mistakes that were made in your bank. As the previous speaker had indicated, you're probably best positioned, as somebody who came...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I ask you in relation to the global liquidity - because this has come up in evidence - and the crisis at that time; if there wasn't a global liquidity crisis at that time, would AIB still have lost ... well, we know it's well in excess of €20 billion, but would it still have cost the taxpayer €20 billion?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, and I'll come to some of those points. But it's been suggested again before the inquiry, and the suggestion goes something like this, that the global liquidity crisis actually could have saved this State money in the long term because there was no indication that the banks were going to stop their concentration into the property and development and commercial property sectors. Do you...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Basically, the suggestion is, is that there was no ... there didn't seem to be a let-up from the banks of investing into concentrated areas such as commercial property, development property, and that what the global financial crisis brought on was basically a realisation that assets were overvalued and would eventually have to be written down.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: As a banker, Mr Duffy ... we know that AIB were beginning to breach the standards of concentration limits in 2006. We've also been told that this was being worked out with the regulator and that this process may change in the future, but, as a banker, with the interest of your shareholders and that concern as one of your core priorities, is it prudent to go above the limits that were in...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: In your opinion, what was the main weakness in the bank's risk appetite process prior to 2011?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The liquidity issues.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And, in your opinion, Mr. Duffy, why weren't those issues addressed by the incumbent management?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is it obvious to you that those issues were serious issues, if you were in that position? Would it be obvious to a banker that they were serious position ... serious issues?