Results 25,341-25,360 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, final question. At another meeting on 14 May 2007 - it's on the same page as the book of evidence, it was noted and I quote "the bank lacked a real understanding of the wider group liquidity, and we were unable to explain the inherent structural risk." And again, this isn't ... this is not the same minute that I referred to earlier on. This is a number of months earlier, your bank...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Could you satisfy this committee?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But the question isn't ... the question is is how could your committee be recording the fact that Ulster Bank lacked a real understanding of the wider group's liquidity, were unable to explain the inherent structural risk of loans that you issued to customers?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay.

Written Answers — Department of Education and Skills: Student Grant Scheme Eligibility (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: 181. To ask the Minister for Education and Skills if she will reconsider allowing documentation from the Department of Social Protection, showing that a social welfare inspector accepts that a person resides independently, for purposes of proving a person (details supplied) in County Donegal qualifies for a student grant; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [17091/15]

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Thank you, a Chathaoirligh, agus fáilte chuig an coiste fiosrúcháin. Can I begin by asking in relation to the Bank of Ireland strategy 2004 to 2009? The earnings per share and the profit before tax targets 15% plus growth per annum, which might appear ambitious in a relatively mature market. What was your view on this and did this lead to going into areas of higher risk?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And at that time, and we've heard that ... you provide evidence in relation to the pilot scheme, but you did start to go into high risk areas. Is that correct?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: For example, we've talked about the pilot scheme in relation to the €25 million that was approved up to €100 million in 2003, which was deemed high risk lending.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Moody's, for example, in 2007-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I'm going to mention that now. We can see it in relation to the core documents BO1 ... B1. Vol. 1. page 95, which is the property concentration in the group's loan book. Moody's-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: There's a number of pages there-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Page 97, which talks about construction and property accounted for 359% of our core ... of our tier 1 capital at the end of September 2007, up from 345% three months earlier, and 275% at March 2006. Moody's also gave you a grading at that time in relation to property concentration and the grading was D. Can you outline to the committee how many grades does Moody's have or grades do Moody have?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Well-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: If we look at Moody's website for example, we will see that they grade banks from A to E. Would that be correct? Would that be your understanding?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So a D rating would be quite low, would that be correct?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And you also received a D rating for borrower concentration, meaning that you were lending too much to individual ... individuals. Would that be a correct assessment?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And you go on to say that you ... selling off some of the loans of the top 20 borrowers would help your rating with Moody's at that time.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The point I'm making is you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But you've identified ... to deal with your concentration risk, you've identified the top 20 borrowers as a way of reducing your concentration risk.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So would that suggest that your bank, under your guidance, lent too much to individual ... to certain individuals that increased the concentration risks to individual borrowers?