Results 25,301-25,320 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And would that all happen before a letter of approval, in principle, would be given to a borrower?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And in your time ... so am I taking from your answer in relation to the procedures they had to go through that you are unaware, during your time as head of the bank, of a loan in excess of €100 million being turned around in a matter of days.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And, again from your experience, as head of the bank, would it be ... are you familiar with situations where bank officials would go after hours to developers' offices or homes to provide them with letters of offers?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Do you have any knowledge of it ever happening?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you, in relation to the ... and I'm referring to book of evidence, UBI - B2, page 28, and this is in relation to the inspection of commercial property lending exposures which was carried out by the Financial Regulator between 4 and 14 December 2007 and its General Findings - Medium Priority. The quote is: The inspector's noted from the minutes of the RBS Group Credit...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. The same inspector's report quotes minutes of the board meeting on 26 September 2007. It's on page 27 of the same book of evidence and it reads and I quote: [The] Chair noted that the bank was not in a position where it had a full understanding of[blanked out customer's name's] liquidity. It was ... strongly emphasised that the bank needed information as to how[the customer] will...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It's on page 27 and it's the inspector's report about how the bank was heavily exposed and uncertain at this stage whether half a billion euro was the right number to be basing their appetite on.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, but that's fine in terms of that there was a response issue. But this your ... this is your board minutes, Mr. McCarthy, and the board is actually saying that the bank wasn't in a position where it had full understanding of the customer's liquidity, that the bank needed information as to how the customer would generate cash, and this is a customer that belongs to a group that had half a...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: At another-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, final question. At another meeting on 14 May 2007 - it's on the same page as the book of evidence, it was noted and I quote "the bank lacked a real understanding of the wider group liquidity, and we were unable to explain the inherent structural risk." And again, this isn't ... this is not the same minute that I referred to earlier on. This is a number of months earlier, your bank...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Could you satisfy this committee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But the question isn't ... the question is is how could your committee be recording the fact that Ulster Bank lacked a real understanding of the wider group's liquidity, were unable to explain the inherent structural risk of loans that you issued to customers?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Written Answers — Department of Education and Skills: Student Grant Scheme Eligibility (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: 181. To ask the Minister for Education and Skills if she will reconsider allowing documentation from the Department of Social Protection, showing that a social welfare inspector accepts that a person resides independently, for purposes of proving a person (details supplied) in County Donegal qualifies for a student grant; and if she will make a statement on the matter. [17091/15]
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Thank you, a Chathaoirligh, agus fáilte chuig an coiste fiosrúcháin. Can I begin by asking in relation to the Bank of Ireland strategy 2004 to 2009? The earnings per share and the profit before tax targets 15% plus growth per annum, which might appear ambitious in a relatively mature market. What was your view on this and did this lead to going into areas of higher risk?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And at that time, and we've heard that ... you provide evidence in relation to the pilot scheme, but you did start to go into high risk areas. Is that correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: For example, we've talked about the pilot scheme in relation to the €25 million that was approved up to €100 million in 2003, which was deemed high risk lending.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Moody's, for example, in 2007-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I'm going to mention that now. We can see it in relation to the core documents BO1 ... B1. Vol. 1. page 95, which is the property concentration in the group's loan book. Moody's-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Apr 2015)
Pearse Doherty: There's a number of pages there-----