Results 25,001-25,020 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I'm not asking you in relation to the specific institution; I'm asking you in general that a bank, an institution that has ... not a bank, an institution that has no access to wholesale markets, no access to ECB monetary operation, is that not a serious issue for the Governor of the Central Bank in relation to its responsibility for the stability of the financial system?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. What was the reaction - as I said, this letter from the office of the regulator was in the first quarter of 2008 - what was the reaction of the Central Bank to the Irish bank share crash in March 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Do you believe that the market reaction to Irish banks at that time was with or without merit?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And the last point of clarification just, I asked you in relation to the minutes of ... of the IFSRA board, which talked about inspections in terms of growth of loan book and large exposures, and with another bank, bank B, in terms of commercial property exposure. You say that wasn't brought to your attention. Would the minutes of this board, the IFSRA board, be brought to your attention?...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Sorry, just to clarify that and----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: There's a number of boards here, so the question is ... the question is your responsibility. Did board minutes come before your desk or any board that you were involved in, were they circulated to you?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Board minutes. IFSRA board minutes, these minutes refer to the Financial Services Regulatory Authority, the minutes of 2004, which deal with the inspections which you say was not brought to your attention. The question is, was Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority minutes brought to the attention of the Governor of the Central Bank and, if so, did you read them up?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh. I want to return to a question that I asked you, one of my final questions in the earlier session, and it was in relation to the Central Bank's reaction to the market ... the share price drop in ... of financial institutions here in this State, and I think you mentioned that this was a market adjustment at the time. Can I say to you, in particular,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did the, did the attacks by the market on that institution on that day lead you to ... lead any red flags to be raised within the Central Bank or, for yourself personally as Governor in relation to the institution?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And the Minister for Finance on that day phoned you from Vietnam, after having a request from this financial institution to speak to him. What was the, what was the initial conversation that you had with the Minister for Finance?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And what did you say to him or what was your view to him?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And after he had the phone conversation with Mr. FitzPatrick, he phoned you again, that day, from Vietnam.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And what was the conclusion or was there an action agreed in relation to that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The last question I have for you is in relation to your opening statement, that was made in July 2008, it was to mark the publication of the 2007 annual report, and there's just a bit in it, it says:While recognising that competitiveness in its broadest sense encompasses a wide range of factors, a realistic approach to wage determination by everyone is nevertheless an essential element in...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So, given your statements in terms of not compensating ourselves for commodity increases, how do you stand over a €78,000 increase from 2003 to 2007, and can you explain how that increase was-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat. Mr. Hurley, can I ask you, in relation to the crisis simulation exercise that was performed by the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, do you think a simulation exercise lasting less than three hours is sufficiently detailed to simulate a realistic scenario?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The simulation exercise that's in our evidence books is a loan ... a lender defaulting on an institution. You didn't simulate a bank defaulting. Can I ask you if you regret that you didn't do that? Can I ask you maybe to also elaborate ... what, from your simulation exercise and your ... the Red Book, I think it's called, did you actually use when the crisis unfolded?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question I have is ... so the events that unfolded on the night of 29 September 2008 ... was that from the playbook of your crisis management book?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Would ... Mr. Hurley, would Anglo Irish Bank have defaulted if a guarantee wasn't extended?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.