Results 24,901-24,920 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, but no consultation with your own division?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, in '06 sorry.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, okay. Can I ask you in relation to the inspection of commercial property lending exposures in December 2007 on the financial institutions? Can I ask you did this cover all of the financial institutions that were eventually guaranteed by the Irish State and what was the purpose of these inspections?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And what was the general findings in relation to the inspections?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It's there on pages I think 62 on.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Vol. 2.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And can I ask you, Ms Burke, what did you do when you figured out that this is what was going on within the financial institutions, that there were issues, as you say, about property developers being able to withstand a downturn, exposures, no net-worth statements. What did you do, as head of banking supervision?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But beyond writing to the banks and saying this ... these are the areas that we're concerned about, was there any other action taken?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. I want to go to, again Vol. 2 of the documents and it's page 86 and it's actually from ... it's from the "Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crises in Ireland", and then paragraph 4.3.5. It says however, it talks about: In the same vein, inspection reports on Anglo during the Period (both in 2004 and 2007) correctly identified a number of more important problems in the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Just, sorry, because it may come up later on, just to clarify with the witness here. It was just on the question of stress testing and devising stress tests. I just looked through the core documents. You did have responsibility in relation to domestic mortgages and stress tests, isn't that correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I asked you the question.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Thanks a million, I think the same question that I've been given has been dealt with adequately, and if not, I'll take direction from the Chair. Can I ask you, Mr. Horan, in relation to a discussion we were having at this committee with another witness in relation to a letter that you signed in March 2008, to a financial institution, which talked about ... an institution having no access to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And that fact that they would be shut out from ECB monetary operations and from the interbank market for a number of months, would that be more than just-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----you know, the liquidity pressures that were being felt across the financial sector at the time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Horan, I want to refer to the core document booklet, Vol. 2, page 134. It's a short reference anyway, but the document references the fact that towards the end of 2007, Irish banks had already lost between 30% and 50% of their value since the start of the year and that this was due to the exposure of Irish banks to the Irish property market. Would you agree or disagree with this...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes. Was the perception of the Irish financial sector's overexposure to commercial and residential property a correct or incorrect perception, in your view?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And can we say or not that by the end of 2007, it was common knowledge in investor circles that the Irish financial sector was overexposed to commercial and residential property, and that this knowledge of the overexposure risk was being reflected in the share price?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is it your view or not that, given that the share price had dropped significantly, as was said between 30% and 50% in the end of 2007, that the markets had already made up their minds in relation to certain financial institutions in this State?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Horan, finally, before I run out of time, you mentioned about being vilified in the media. You mention in your opening statement that you believe you are a contrarian voice, and you've added evidence to the committee in relation to back up those assertions. In relation to being vilified in the media, can I ask you, because the Irish public would be very aware of your involvement in the...