Results 24,861-24,880 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, but it wasn't specific to Ireland?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In your opening statement you say "The possible nationalisation of Anglo raised issues, both in terms of lack of an immediate legislative provision (although it could perhaps have been ready by the following weekend)". So, that's your evidence. Are you aware that that is contradicted by what Governor Hurley has said ... that the legislation was available and what's your view in...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. I want to go to page 45 of Vol. 2 of the evidence book. It's the minute of the meeting on 25 September 2008, which was referred to earlier on. And I just want to focus in on the bit where David, and I'm quoting, "D[avid] Doyle noted that Government would need a good idea of the potential loss exposure ... within Anglo and INBS - on some assumptions INBS could be 2bn after capital and...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It's a public document. In relation to this here ... just in relation to the accuracy of that part of the minute, do you agree with it or do you disagree with it and can you outline to the committee, if you disagree with it, what part of it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. So that's the point. I appreciate that it's not your minute. It is the minute of the meeting that you attended, and my question is, in your recollection, does that minute reflect what happened or what was said and, if not, what in your view was said that would best reflect what should be in that minute?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Grimes, you mentioned earlier on that there was an issue, I think, or words to that effect, in relation to ... in relation to after capital or before capital, and that has been suggested to the committee before. Is that your view, or is it not your view, or do you have any view in relation to this?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: A Chathaoirligh ... fáilte. Can I ask you first of all who was responsible for creating and updating the stress tests scenarios and why weren't they effective in predicting the banks' failures?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So you would have had no role in relation to the stress tests during your period as head of-----?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, but no consultation with your own division?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, in '06 sorry.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, okay. Can I ask you in relation to the inspection of commercial property lending exposures in December 2007 on the financial institutions? Can I ask you did this cover all of the financial institutions that were eventually guaranteed by the Irish State and what was the purpose of these inspections?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And what was the general findings in relation to the inspections?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It's there on pages I think 62 on.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Vol. 2.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And can I ask you, Ms Burke, what did you do when you figured out that this is what was going on within the financial institutions, that there were issues, as you say, about property developers being able to withstand a downturn, exposures, no net-worth statements. What did you do, as head of banking supervision?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But beyond writing to the banks and saying this ... these are the areas that we're concerned about, was there any other action taken?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. I want to go to, again Vol. 2 of the documents and it's page 86 and it's actually from ... it's from the "Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crises in Ireland", and then paragraph 4.3.5. It says however, it talks about: In the same vein, inspection reports on Anglo during the Period (both in 2004 and 2007) correctly identified a number of more important problems in the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Just, sorry, because it may come up later on, just to clarify with the witness here. It was just on the question of stress testing and devising stress tests. I just looked through the core documents. You did have responsibility in relation to domestic mortgages and stress tests, isn't that correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I asked you the question.