Results 24,821-24,840 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No. And which ... what year was that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: 2003. What was the reaction of the Financial Regulator's office to the Northern Rock crisis in 2007?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And, outside of the domestic standing group, what did you do in terms of the funding model? Was Northern ... Northern Rock was ... there was a core issue there in terms of relying on wholesale markets and so on. What did you do as Financial Regulator, given the alarm bells that were ringing just across the water in terms of that kind of banking model?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you have the power to go in and inspect, root-and-branch inspection, into financial institutions such as Anglo or Nationwide or AIB?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you authorise a root-and-branch inspection of those institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Any time after even?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I think you may be referencing the commercial property exposure of the financial institutions and also the five of five, I think, the five top institutions that you-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question I'm trying to get the answer to is, what did you do? So when these reports come back and showed major exposure to commercial property and major exposure to individual lenders, not repeating myself, but the fact that 20 individuals held half the loan book in, in two of the institutions and similar patterns in others, what did you do?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Right, I'll move on. We're back to the letters. In evidence presented to the committee, we were told of a meeting that took place on 6 September 2008 which involved representatives from the Financial Regulator, AIB, Bank of Ireland, the purpose was to discuss the serious situation facing Irish Nationwide Building Society. Do you recall the meeting first of all before I go on?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Were you at it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No. Okay. At the meeting board minutes from AIB on 7 September suggest that ... they quote "The funding profile of the institution was weak, and it was unlikely to be able to refinance funding that was maturing periodically over the ensuing year, commencing in December 2008." It goes on to say, "The quality of loans was suspect and could require write-downs ranging from a benign 13%...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Richie Boucher told the committee ... he said in his statement ... he goes, ''I recall being shocked and shaken by the lack of information available to the executives of INBS and the Central Bank of Ireland on the liquidity position of INBS." He went on to say:at some stage I said to my colleague, "We should leave this meeting". We said, "We can't carry on this discussion". How can...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can you comment on the decision ... on why the decision to nationalise Anglo was not taken on the night of the guarantee and what was your advice to Government or the Governor in this regard at the time and can you discuss if nationalisation of Anglo earlier would have sped up the resolution to the crisis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What was the arguments in favour? You mentioned that there were two options, when you went into, I think, the second meeting one was nationalising, one was a blanket guarantee, and the other was nationalising Anglo and a guarantee for the five other institutions. What were the arguments in favour of the second option, nationalising Anglo and guaranteeing the other five institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Got to that point.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, but you weren't aware, you weren't in the room when those arguments were taking place?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, I'll move on. Mr. Neary, Dermot Gleeson gave evidence to the committee ... he was talking about a meeting, the meeting the night of the guarantee, and he says, and I quote:During the course of the night we suggested to the authorities that a sentence in their draft statement about the guarantee, which said something like [quote] ‘Financial Regulator has informed the Government...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Neary, you appeared on "Prime Time" on 2 October 2008 to discuss the domestic Irish banking system and the Irish bank guarantee. You said, and I'll quote it back to you, "The important thing is that risks emerge over the lifetime of the loan portfolio, and it's important that there is adequate capital put in there to absorb those risks, and by any estimate the Irish banks are so...