Results 24,781-24,800 of 35,925 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you, your predecessor of the CEO of the Financial Regulator made a comment for the purpose of the internal review of the crisis simulation exercise in 2005. He said "That in a crisis [and this is summarised] ... that in a crisis scenario, there is a limit to the type of information that can be provided by a principles-based regulator". Can you comment on how ... on this and...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Neary, I'd like to now discuss, if I may, loan concentration, not by sector but by borrower, and we know and the public are now becoming knowledgeable of these matters after the event as information started to trickle out, but you, in your capacity as CEO of the Financial Regulator, I assume, would have all of this information at hand-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----at the time ... at the time. We know from the Nyberg report that the top 20 customers in Anglo Irish Bank at May 2008 had 50% of the Irish loan book, which was €41.7 billion at the time. Now that's 20 borrowers in that bank had 50% of the loan book, that's more ... there's more people in this room than had 50% of the loan book of Anglo Irish Bank. We know in terms of INBS that...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No ... okay-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Sorry.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Right, Mr. Neary, you were the regulator or what people perceived as the regulator, the CEO ... you were fully aware, you're telling this committee, that half of the Irish loan book of Anglo Irish Bank resided in the hands of 20 of its customers. That 51% ... at the time ... at the time that 51% of the commercial loan book of INBS resided in the hands of 25 individuals. ...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I put to you that when the lawyer and academic, Bill Black, appeared before this committee, he was asked about these types of concentrations and he said and I'll quote:I have never seen a concentration that high at any financial institution of any size anywhere in the world at any time in history. It is absolutely - no question ... no ifs, ands or buts - utterly unsafe and unsound...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: With respect, Mr. Neary, nobody is suggesting that you are saying the individual ... individual customers but let's be clear in this here: the transposition of the directive actually does exactly what you are arguing that you should not be able to do. It does put limits in relation to the type of loans that can be given by financial institutions in relation to their own resources to ... to...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I just say, and I ... I make this point. When the Central Bank issued their notice to the banks, you actually state in it while it was minimum requirements, you have increased the requirements for directors and shareholders. So I'm not sure if that was the same that happened right across Europe. But you had the ability to increase the requirements in relation to concentration of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----why did you do nothing?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh. Mr. Neary, can I ask you to outline your knowledge on events and analysis that led to the initial drafting of legislation in the spring of 2008 to permit the Minister to nationalise a financial institution? And can you outline to us what advice, if any, did you give ... did the Financial Regulator offer in this regard?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And when was the legislation drafted?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And is your belief that it was for a building society, or a bank, or in which order did that legislation because they would differ?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, that's fine. If you've never seen it, that's fine. Can you comment on the liquidity policies, the compliance monitoring, the procedures and protection measures in force, and actions taken before and during the crisis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And can you tell the committee, just in relation to any financial institution or building society with liquidity and/or solvency issues prior to 30 September 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And we've had evidence before, and we've discussed this with Mr. Horan yesterday, that there was a financial institution that had no access to ECB monetary finances, no access to the markets, interbank markets, and were relying solely on deposits in the first quarter of 2008-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----were you aware of that? And how serious or significant or otherwise was that?