Results 24,681-24,700 of 35,924 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh. Fáilte romhat, Ms O'Dea. Can I first ask you during your period as acting CEO of the Financial Regulator you'd initiated a number of changes to increase the intensity of banking supervision. Can you describe to the committee some of the key changes you made during that period?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. You mentioned, and correct me if I'm wrong, to Deputy McGrath that during your period, principles regulation was not active, that you weren't practising. Is that correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So what, what type of regulation were you practising?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So my understanding, and obviously I am a lay person in this here, there's principles-based regulation or there's rules-based regulation. I didn't know that there was a middle one called intrusive regulation. Is that an international standard-type of regulation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The principles of the Financial Regulator appeared in the annual report of 2006 for the first time in public which outlined the nine principles in ... principle No. 8 talks about the that the financial institutions have to comply with any rules that are laid down by the Financial Regulator. Did you scrap those principles when you took ... when you abandoned principles-based regulation or...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, but that ... that ... that's what I want you to explain to me because I get a sense that you applied the same principles-based regulation, but you just applied them more intrusively. There was ... you didn't ... you didn't have to change any rules, you didn't have to have a change of documents, you just actually decided to send investigators into the banks, which were always the power...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Everything that was done-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----under your term, could it have been done without any change to the principles in the previous term of the Financial Regulator?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I ask you in relation to ... it's in Vol. 1, page 4 ... it's a document ... it's the first meeting of the implementation group on further reform of regulatory structures held on 24 June 2009. There was discussion about the press release, I think, from the Government sent out on June 18 2009 and I'll quote from the document. It says: ''The reference to a specific differential regulatory...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, I'll finish at this: "The Central Bank's concerned that this might be perceived in the market as us suggesting lighter tough regulatory approach for IFSC entities than to domestic entities which could have negative reputational consequences for new structures''. So the question I am asking you is: what were the concerns of the ... at the time in relation to this idea of light-touch...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat a Chathaoirligh agus fáilte Mr. Roux chuig an coiste. Can I ask you just at the beginning to give us an outline of your understanding, your opinion of the Central Bank's knowledge of the financial institutions, both when you commenced work at the Central Bank and your opinion of the knowledge that the Central Bank has now?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Very well, so we know them very well at this point in this time-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question I was asking as well is: what's your opinion of the Central Bank's knowledge at the time when you ... when you took up office? Where do you think ... what type of knowledge do you think that they had gained at that point?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. And what's your opinion regarding the clarity of roles and accountability amongst the regulatory supervisory institutions and the State and the Department of Finance?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. And that's something that Governor Honohan has raised before, before Oireachtas committees here in this House. Mr. Roux, can I refer to the core booklet, Vol. 1, page 26. I'll read out the section and it's very short. It's headed "Examples of Interactive Engagement". It says "Based on a review of [the] sample of board papers during 1992, 1995 and 2000, we have not identified...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: These papers talk about that there's ... that there was none of them escalated, they were all dealt with "interactive engagement based on moral suasion". How common would that be from your experience in other jurisdictions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you just to-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you just to, finally, in terms of light-touch regulation, I'm not sure if you're aware of it. It's an issue I have raised in the House before. One of the companies that you regulate, on their website promoted that they were basing a facility which provided light-touch regulation without the costs of an offshore entity, without the ... or a tax haven without the costs of a...