Results 24,521-24,540 of 35,924 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Were you nervous?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Could I just ask, just on that point, the information that he said ... you said you would look for in terms of the bonuses, if that could be furnished?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, agus fáilte ag an coiste, tUasal Doyle. Can you describe the general nature of the advices, if any, that you provided to the Minister and the Government on the risks involved and especially the growing dependency on construction-related economic activity and tax revenues? And, Mr. Doyle, can you refer in your response to the frequencies of such...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: As general secretary.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Some people believe they're connected, but anyway.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You state that this stress test, in your opening statement, conducted by the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator weren't based on the worst-case scenarios. Did the Department have concerns, or not, about the adequacy of these tests at the time and were those concerns expressed to the Central Bank or to the regulator?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I heard your comments in that the question specifically is, did you have concerns in relation to the adequacy of the stress tests and if you did at the time, did you ... make that, did you make your views aware to the Central Bank or regulator?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You didn't have the concerns so that's the way ... I'll move on to the next question. You were a board member of the Central Bank ... you were the Secretary General of the Department of Finance, you had a bird's eye view in relation to both prudential supervision, the stability of the financial sector, and also the issues in relation to the Department. Given everything that was happening in...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I'm talking about any time when you were on the board of the Central Bank and general secretary to the Department of Finance, why didn't you do anything to try and stem the problems that the people in that room, on the night of the guarantee, faced?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: If you had a bright idea, it was too late in 2006. My question to you, Mr. Doyle, is did you even have a bright idea after 2006?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I'm sorry, I think the quote was put to me, or was about to be put to me and has been put to the committee beforehand.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You gave evidence to the committee in relation to previous questioning about the Merrill Lynch analysis, and the document about €8.5 billion capital for Anglo after ... after capital, and about €2 billion for Nationwide. And you mentioned that Merrill Lynch said this is tip of the finger tips, or some language of that sort. Top of the finger tips data, it wasn't an in-depth...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You believed all that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you, on the night of the guarantee - forget about whether they were insolvent or not, because I think that's some ... a bit of semantics, because solvency is not just solvent on that point in time, it's the risk of solvency in the future - was there any concern raised in the meetings that took place on the night of guarantee in relation to the risk of solvency of either...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I understand that. I'm not talking about the danger of an illiquid bank becoming insolvent. I'm talking about an analysis from some financial institutions or others that the banks themselves, given the loan losses, not the illiquid nature of the bank, could be insolvent in the future.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And was that ... you mentioned problems, because you had problems arising and so on in the past and in evidence that you've given, was that named in the meetings, as in, "There is a potential risk of Anglo Irish Bank or Irish Nationwide becoming insolvent as a result of loan losses and its lending?" Was words to that effect mentioned by anybody in any of those meetings?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Can I ask you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you in relation to the guarantee itself ... and explain this to me because I've not been ... we've not been able to get this at the committee so far. The guarantee was announced by Government. When did the banks, legally ... when were we contracted, bound by the guarantee? There's evidence here in the book, I think, which talks about ... it's page 26, Vol. 3, which says...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And the capital ... when did you begin to know that capital would be needed? Did you know on the night of the guarantee that at least some capital would be needed for these institutions or how soon did you know, with the first date we have here is sometime at the end of the October?