Results 24,321-24,340 of 35,924 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So did you ... when you say than ... give them more than they clearly needed? So at that time, were you aware that they needed more capital than the €10 billion?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well, that takes me onto my second question. Can you tell us about the level of co-operation by both AIB and Bank of Ireland at the time of the ... capital-raising options, including asset sales, that you mentioned and, in particular, whether the level of co-operation may have contributed to the amount of capital ultimately required by both institutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, can I ask you ... just I'm just referring to your core booklet, Vol. 3, and it's page 146, and this is the document from the NTMA on the 28 March 2011. It's the document that recommends the burning of bondholders - senior bondholders - in all of the six institutions to the Government at that time. I think the eligible senior debt they estimate across the six banks was €16.367...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: At that time, now, the Minister was talking about Anglo and Nationwide, but the NTMA recommendation was across all six banks. And my particular question was that the NTMA were supporting the burning of senior bondholders while at the same time being of the view that they would be able to access money from the ... the international money markets within a number of years. That the case wasn't...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I ask you, in your statement you say, on page 90, in relation to the Government's proposal to the troika, you say: As we expected, the Troika were not dissatisfied with the Plan – in some ways it was more ambitious than they might have expected in regard to structural reform. Of course there remained differences arising from differences in the economic forecasts, but the basic...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So it was mainly made up of Irish Government, with ... excluding the banking part of it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Cardiff, in your statement, on page 2008 or 208 - 2008, Freudian slip there - 208 you say, "I had spoken to the Minister during the summer [this is the summer of 2010] about the necessity to make greater upfront fiscal adjustments for 2011, and to announce them early." You go on to say that at a gathering of senior civil servants in September or early October you outlined the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: If I can ask - if that is the final question - at the end of that speech Mr. Cardiff, you ask those, to be a hero, you ask them ... you say, "We have a crisis, get into it, fight for change, fight for savings, fight to deliver more services with less money, get radical, think the unthinkable." And then you pose a question where you say "in four years' time we'll look back and we'll ask...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But the ... sorry, the direct question, because Mr. Cardiff you introduced the quote-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, it's not a new line. Mr. Cardiff, you introduced this to the committee, your speech, your "be a hero" speech and you posed the question yourself, "In four years' time we'll look back and we'll ask ourselves what type of character we were in the crisis, be a hero." The question I asked you is looking back - it's now five years on - do you classify that your actions were heroic?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I begin by asking you, as a senior Department of Finance official charged with what you say in your witness statement, the application of better regulation, how effective in your opinion was the regulatory regime for financial services from the years 2005 to 2008, given your Department's overall responsibility for, I quote, "overseeing the performance of the regulatory structures for...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well ... how ... the question is: how effective, in your opinion, was the regime - the regulatory regime?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Outside of the structure, as I said, and you say you're in official charge of the application of better regulation, how did you ... how do you believe ... how effective, or not, was the regulatory regime that was practised within those structures that you're just talking about?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Beausang, you mention on page 5 of your statement, you mention the Department of the Taoiseach's Clearing House Group. Can you tell the committee what was the Clearing House Group and what role, if any, did the Department of Finance have in this group?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Who were the participants?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Who were the participants?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So, these were bankers, were they?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Some?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Along with that, was the politicians, was it? Was there politicians on the group, no?