Results 24,221-24,240 of 35,924 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Do you have any idea why that work wasn't done, given that the drip feeding of capital into these banks could have caused a concern that ... "where will this end" for the markets?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: It was a troika requirement as opposed to an Irish requirement. It was the troika that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can you comment on the whether the level of co-operation by the banks contributed to the amount of capital ultimately required or not?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor Honohan, on ... in your statement, on page 3, it deals with the options in relation to the banks and the capital buffer that the banks would require. The ... option 1, which you outline, is asking the banks up an unquestionable "ample capital buffer" to cover all eventualities, which you say "would have triggered an immediate loss of market confidence in the Government's finances...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: March 2010. So, the two options seem very clear to me. That ... the first option was, ask the banks to get the capital that you think they may need to cover all eventualities, which would've resulted in a possible IMF programme and the second option was to go with a minimal approach but also having recourse to an IMF programme if need be. Was it ... so, IMF seemed to be very much under...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Let's go with what actually happened-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----after BlackRock.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: We did overcapitalise the banks.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor, the statements at the time, in this House and elsewhere, was that the banks were the most capitalised banks in the world. That the capitalisation of the banks were in the high double digits ... high teens, which was way beyond the regulatory requirement for capitalisation. So, the question is: how could we, you know ... I put it to you, that we did overcapitalise the banks, which...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Can I go to the footnote on page 3, and this is where we're focused on coming up to the September 2010 and the funding cliff?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And you say that you considered possible alternative course of actions which might be recommended to Government. And you elaborate on that, you say "One such possibility was for the Government to abrogate the bank guarantee (in respect of Anglo and [Irish Nationwide Building Society]) in August or September 2010 and ... bail-in the bond holders and potentially large depositors." You go on...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And your considerations-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And your consideration of revoking the bank guarantee at that period and burning bondholders and large depositors, you say that the risks to this being successful was that the ECB might have demanded that the procedure was reversed, and that we would be back at square one, we'd be back at the first point where the guarantee was still in effect and we would have lost market confidence. Was...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Governor Honohan, I'm referring to your core booklets, Vol. 1, page 68, and the document is a memorandum for the Government, "State Aid Notification of Capital Support for Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Nationwide ... and [EBS]". It's dated 8 February 2010 and the final paragraph says: The method proposed by the Minister to support Anglo and ... INBS through the issue of a Promissory Note...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Just to clarify, so the €30 billion, the €30 billion that was put into Anglo on the promissory note, you're saying that the documentation that you may have access to, which showed calculations that you mention, showed that that money would be paid back to the State at a certain point in time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Sorry, hang on, sorry, would you, yes, I appreciate that, but if you were winding it up, because the promissory note-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, but that's not the question, the question is, the promissory note was constructed in a way where there was a drip of capital going into Anglo Irish Bank over a long period of time, more than a decade. The question is, was the Government of the view that that money would have come back to the Government at a point in time? Because the point that I'm making here, in terms of the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, thanks.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor Honohan, I'm sure you're aware - maybe if you can tell us if you're not - of the NTMA proposal to burn senior bondholders across all of the six institutions, which came out in March 2011. I've a question, just in ... it's quite interesting, the senior bondholders which they say were unguaranteed at the time, that they would have saved just shy of €8 billion if that...