Results 24,201-24,220 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I go to the footnote on page 3, and this is where we're focused on coming up to the September 2010 and the funding cliff?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And you say that you considered possible alternative course of actions which might be recommended to Government. And you elaborate on that, you say "One such possibility was for the Government to abrogate the bank guarantee (in respect of Anglo and [Irish Nationwide Building Society]) in August or September 2010 and ... bail-in the bond holders and potentially large depositors." You go on...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And your considerations-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And your consideration of revoking the bank guarantee at that period and burning bondholders and large depositors, you say that the risks to this being successful was that the ECB might have demanded that the procedure was reversed, and that we would be back at square one, we'd be back at the first point where the guarantee was still in effect and we would have lost market confidence. Was...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Governor Honohan, I'm referring to your core booklets, Vol. 1, page 68, and the document is a memorandum for the Government, "State Aid Notification of Capital Support for Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Nationwide ... and [EBS]". It's dated 8 February 2010 and the final paragraph says: The method proposed by the Minister to support Anglo and ... INBS through the issue of a Promissory Note...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Just to clarify, so the €30 billion, the €30 billion that was put into Anglo on the promissory note, you're saying that the documentation that you may have access to, which showed calculations that you mention, showed that that money would be paid back to the State at a certain point in time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Sorry, hang on, sorry, would you, yes, I appreciate that, but if you were winding it up, because the promissory note-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, but that's not the question, the question is, the promissory note was constructed in a way where there was a drip of capital going into Anglo Irish Bank over a long period of time, more than a decade. The question is, was the Government of the view that that money would have come back to the Government at a point in time? Because the point that I'm making here, in terms of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, thanks.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Professor Honohan, I'm sure you're aware - maybe if you can tell us if you're not - of the NTMA proposal to burn senior bondholders across all of the six institutions, which came out in March 2011. I've a question, just in ... it's quite interesting, the senior bondholders which they say were unguaranteed at the time, that they would have saved just shy of €8 billion if that...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----given the fact that the NTMA, in 2011, were saying, "We could save €8 billion on unguaranteed bondholders alone"-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I'm on 2008. Given that they were saying the unguaranteed bondholders, "We could save €8 billion", how can you justify-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----an estimate as low as €2 billion to €8 billion-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well, could one not argue that the €64 billion that was put into the banks through the recapitalisation programme caused the ultimate chaos in the domestic economy, in terms of mass unemployment------
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Moving on from that question because-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But I would appreciate, maybe, if you had papers that came up with those calculations, if they could be submitted to the inquiry if there's calculations that you have. But can I ask you, in terms of the ... again the NTMA, but it's the principle of it ... how could the NTMA be arguing for the burning of senior bondholders, given what we were told along, that senior bondholders would be...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It's not the proposal, it's the principle, and what I want you to confirm or reject is that burning of senior bondholders automatically did not mean that you had to burn depositors in financial institutions.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I appreciate that. Can I ask you, in relation to-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, that's... that's fair. Can I ask you, in relation to solvency ratios, as distinct from minimum capital ratios for the banks-----