Results 24,181-24,200 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Written Answers — Department of Finance: National Economic Dialogue (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: 86. To ask the Minister for Finance if he will provide a list of the persons and organisations invited to take part in the National Economic Dialogue on 16 and 17 July 2015. [25457/15]

Written Answers — Department of Health: Medical Card Applications (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: 164. To ask the Minister for Health when a person (details supplied) in County Donegal will have an application for a medical card processed; and if he will make a statement on the matter. [25476/15]

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, agus fáilte roimh an tUasal Honohan. Agus go n-éirí an bóthar leat agus tú ag éirí as do phost, agus tuigim fosta go seo an chéad píosa fianaise a tugadh dúinn i nGaeilge, leis an seanfhocal a thabhair tú isteach le d'óráíd so tá fáilte roimhe sin fosta. Can I ask you, first...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Can you give, maybe, the committee an example of two powers that you have now, as Governor of the Central Bank, that your predecessor didn't have that would have had or possibly could have had an impact in the period running up to 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Thanks for that, Professor Honohan. Would I be right in saying that, like, the two examples that you gave me were the increase levels of fines, but the fines ... there was a level of fine that existed to your predecessor which was not utilised, and the second one was the loan-to-value ratios that could've ... that the power existed by your predecessor, but wasn't utilised either? So in ......

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. I appreciate that. The IMF mission in 2009 referred to the lack of a resolution regime. Can you explain the delays in initiating such a regime in Ireland, bearing in mind that the UK implemented one by way of its Banking Act in March 2009?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: From instigation ... from the point where a decision was made to introduce that resolution regime to the point where it was published-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----what type of timeframe are we talking about?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What I'm trying to find out, and maybe you don't know this, but we've had ... we've had evidence to this committee saying that bringing in a resolution regime would have taken too much time, that there was constitutional issues and so on and so forth. But, as you say, we brought in a type of regime in 2010. The question is: how long did it take? Because we brought it in at a certain stage....

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I'll come to that in a while. Can you comment on the Central Bank's analysis carried out to identify the amounts of €3.5 billion in capital for AIB and Bank of Ireland that was announced in 2009, February 2009, was provided at that time? And why did the Government proceed with this amount for AIB given that it ultimately required a capital injection on €19.8 billion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Do you have any idea why that work wasn't done, given that the drip feeding of capital into these banks could have caused a concern that ... "where will this end" for the markets?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: It was a troika requirement as opposed to an Irish requirement. It was the troika that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can you comment on the whether the level of co-operation by the banks contributed to the amount of capital ultimately required or not?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor Honohan, on ... in your statement, on page 3, it deals with the options in relation to the banks and the capital buffer that the banks would require. The ... option 1, which you outline, is asking the banks up an unquestionable "ample capital buffer" to cover all eventualities, which you say "would have triggered an immediate loss of market confidence in the Government's finances...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: March 2010. So, the two options seem very clear to me. That ... the first option was, ask the banks to get the capital that you think they may need to cover all eventualities, which would've resulted in a possible IMF programme and the second option was to go with a minimal approach but also having recourse to an IMF programme if need be. Was it ... so, IMF seemed to be very much under...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Let's go with what actually happened-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----after BlackRock.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: We did overcapitalise the banks.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Professor, the statements at the time, in this House and elsewhere, was that the banks were the most capitalised banks in the world. That the capitalisation of the banks were in the high double digits ... high teens, which was way beyond the regulatory requirement for capitalisation. So, the question is: how could we, you know ... I put it to you, that we did overcapitalise the banks, which...