Results 23,941-23,960 of 35,894 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So if INBS were to lose the likes of €2 billion, which is suggested by David Doyle on some assumptions, would you have been aware that it would be extremely difficult for them to get back into the markets to raise that capital, given the fact that they've been shut out for six months prior to that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So if there was losses of this nature would it not be the State that would have had to step in?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, I'm not saying nationalise.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Even if you were guaranteeing it?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But the question I asked you earlier on was when was the first indication or suggestion that capital may be needed for the banks? And you talked about the PwC report in November. What I'm saying to you, is this not a suggestion that capital may be required by banks which were locked out of the capital markets for months at that stage, or at least one of them was locked out, and therefore the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well, the Irish Nationwide had capital of just in excess of €2 billion, so it wouldn't necessarily be insolvent under that, but you would need to take it back up to the capital regulatory capital requirement. Wouldn't that be the case?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I go to ... can I go to David Doyle's testimony to the banking inquiry, on page 115, and David Doyle, under questioning by myself, talked about there was a consideration that illiquidity would rapidly become insolvency, this is on the night of the guarantee. But, I pushed him in relation to, setting aside that risk of an illiquid bank becoming insolvent, was there an analysis,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But, what I'm ... the point I'm making, Mr. Cowen, is if this was simply just a liquidity problem there would be no sense on anybody arguing to nationalise banks on that night, if you were going to give a guarantee to the other institutions, because the guarantee should solve, at least temporary, the liquidity problem. The reason that there was two very senior individuals, the Minister for...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I'm not-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I, I understand, you've, you've given the context of why you did not support the nationalisation.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The point I'm trying to get to, Mr. Cowen, is, was that not the, the background to the debate about nationalisation of those two institutions, as opposed to liquidity? The reason I'm saying this is because at the meeting that night there was a, there was a viewpoint expressed that there was loan losses in those two institutions-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----and that you were aware of those potential loan losses.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat. Mr. Cowen, in your statement, you said with regard to the Financial Regulator there was: A failure to properly judge the risk that was building up in the banks and that the 2003 legislation dividing the micro and macroeconomic responsibilities between the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank did not work as well as intended, and that consumer protection aspects...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And it's been reported before that during your tenure as Minister for Finance, which spanned a four-year period, that you met with the Financial Regulator, Mr. Neary, on two occasions during that four years. Would that be a correct view? I think it was reported that your official diary suggests that.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you only meet the financial ... the question is because I am not sure if that is correct or not, did you only meet the Financial Regulator, Mr. Neary, on two occasions during your four years as Finance Minister on a formal capacity?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Cowen, like, we have discussed earlier on in this morning's evidence that you met Seanie FitzPatrick for a game of golf, you had a private dinner with him within a number of weeks within 2008. Yet, in a four-year period where there is a responsibility for oversight on the Financial Regulator; you only met with the Financial Regulator on two occasions during a time of turbulence at that...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Cowen, in late 2008 to early 2009, in your view, did the guarantee decision stop working in terms of giving Irish banks the sufficient access to non-ECB liquidity? And the reason I point this out is on page 4 of the evidence book on, sorry, on page 3 of the evidence books, Vol. 5, there is a note there which clearly states that - and this is on ... this is in March 2009, just a number of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: How long did the guarantee work for in terms of providing non-ECB liquidity? It's clear here that it has failed by-----