Results 23,901-23,920 of 35,924 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: When you say no information, like ... at that stage we're well into the crisis, there is meetings taking place on a regular basis. Could it be the case that they were holding the information from the NTMA, or do you believe-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And in relation to INBS? Is it the same views, in relation to INBS?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: On 25 September there was a meeting held including the Taoiseach, the Minister for Finance, senior advisers, including the NTMA. You weren't there yourself, Mr. McDonagh, but two representatives including the CEO was there from the NTMA and they discussed the liquidity issues of Anglo and INBS. Did the NTMA, did Mr. Somers or Mr. Corrigan talk to you in relation to the outcome of the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I'd say that ... we can discuss the Merrill Lynch option now in a minute, but in the lead-up to the decision on the blanket guarantee, what alternatives ... was there any alternatives other than the Merrill Lynch options were considered? And how were those options evaluated against one another? What advice was the NTMA given on each of the options?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. And they were the only options that were being discussed at that time? The options are encapsulated in the Merrill Lynch-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. And if we can see, Merrill Lynch Summary Options, this is on page 33 of your core books. So there's five options outlined there. Which one was the NTMA arguing strongly for or was it a hybrid?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Merrill Lynch went on to give a presentation and it's I think on page 41 of the core booklets ... it starts on page 41 gave a presentation a couple of days later. And on page 44 it talks about the equity and debt investors and this would be in the context of what they called "State protective custody", or nationalisation. And it says, "At Anglo the majority of equity and debt investors are...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. And on the presentation that Merrill Lynch gave yourselves, did they mention the fact that ... did they mention Seán Quinn? His name doesn't appear in that but he's the only name that appears on the presentation that was given a couple of days later.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. In your ... was there any, in your discussions ... I know you weren't there on the night of the guarantee. So you weren't in the room on the night of the guarantee but in relation to wiping out the shareholders and the potential spillover effects that they may or may not have on other areas, was that ever considered or discussed to your knowledge in the meetings that you were at?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In your previous evidence, you told us that you've spent about four hours in Government Buildings on the night, 29 September, the night of the guarantee, during which time you spoke to Mr. Beausang. Can you describe any conversations you had with him and other parties, identifying the parties and the topics discussed?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You see, if you were - and this is speculative now - but if you were called into the meeting, into the room, when the decision was being trashed out and if the Taoiseach turned to you and asked you, "Mr. McDonagh, what is your view in terms of what we should do and justify your view?" What would you have said to the Taoiseach?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You were outside the room for four hours, knowing that at any minute you could be called in.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. McDonagh, the NTMA refused to place deposits at a certain stage in 2007 with Nationwide and Anglo, or renew the Anglo deposits and only did so under direction from the Minister for Finance. Who made that decision within the NTMA? Not actually, who authorised it eventually, but who said, "I think we shouldn't do this"? Who was it personally instigated it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And you say in your opening statement that it was not an easy decision to justify. Did you have to justify this decision to anybody outside of the NTMA?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. McDonagh, the State injected €20.7 billion from the National Pensions Reserve Fund into AIB and Bank of Ireland. Dr. Somers will tell us later that, in 2009, the discretionary portfolio was making a return of 20.6%. Have you any indication of what type of return that €20.7 billion that went from the National Pensions Reserve Fund into the banks could have made, in the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Just explain that to the layperson who doesn't follow the Dow Jones.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So the €20 billion investment, if it stayed within the National Pension Reserve Fund could have increased by about 50%?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. McDonagh, the committee has heard evidence with regard to the bail-in strategy developed by the NTMA in March 2011 and I appreciate you weren't with the NTMA at that time. With regards to your time with the NTMA, was there any discussion around possible bail-ins or hair cuts for senior or subordinate bondholders?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: And can you talk to us what ... there was a bail-in then developed later on in 2011. It was as they ... the justification was we were going into a programme, we were out of the markets for a number of years. Can you talk to the narrative about that ... if you burned the bondholders, that the markets would be waiting to punish you in the long grass. Is that not the way that markets work or...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. We were ... you were dealing with Senator O'Keeffe in terms of the e-mail asking your opinion on if they went with the ... one of the options, which wasn't the option they eventually went with, and how much it would cost the State in terms of bond yields rising. Do you have any estimation as to the cost to the State of actually the decision on the guarantee in terms how much extra it...