Results 23,321-23,340 of 35,893 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay ... if we can go, look at Vol. 1, page 51, this is Anglo's annual report for 2007 and it shows over the period 2002-2007, profit before tax increased by 376%, earnings per share by 363% and total assets by 398%. The graphs speak for themselves in terms of the rapid rise of Anglo in those three areas. Do you think that these levels of growth were prudent or sustainable, in the context...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But the question isn't about ... we know that the bank grew-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: We know that the bank grew and we know that the bank stopped growing and rapidly went the other direction. The question is ... is in relation to the risk-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----is, were you blinded by the growth? And I mentioned, for example, the earnings per share increasing by 363% over that five-year period. Now, 90% of employees of Anglo Irish Bank were shareholders with the bank. Were individuals blinded by the rapid growth and the rapid growth in share prices and took additional risks as a result of that? Was it affecting credit quality? Was it...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, that's not the question, sorry, Mr. Drury. The question really is: did the growth, and the pursuit of growth, by Anglo Irish Bank affect credit quality and lending standards, in your opinion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: That's one part of it.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, you believe lending standards weren't reduced as a result of that. As an independent non-executive director, did you ever have concerns over the levels of exceptions to credit policies as detailed in the monthly risk management reports? And we can see from page 57 of the core documents there in relation to the level of exceptions which were happening in the period of 2008 which were...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes okay, and during that time, in April 2008, it was 28%; the previous month it was 28%; the previous month it was 26%.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: These are exceptions to your own credit policy and which you were a member of that board. Did it raise concern to you as a member of that board, and as chairperson of that board?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Drury, were you aware of the concentration of lending at Anglo Irish Bank to a relatively small number of developers?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes but were you aware-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----of the concentration of lending to a small group of individuals? I think half the loan book went to, what, 20 individuals.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. I'd like to refer to core booklet, Vol. 1, again, and it's page 97. These are the minutes of the risk and compliance meeting that was held on 24 May 2007. The issue being discussed is the suggested revision of Anglo's minimum capital ratio requirements. It says in the document: The committee reviewed and considered the proposal and in particular the key reasons for the Group's...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Do you regret that decision now?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But even knowing what you know now, for example, if you didn't reduce the capital in the bank at that time, the Irish taxpayers would have had to put less money into the bank that you were a director of. Do you not regret that fact? That was the consequences of the decision that was taken at a meeting-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, Mr. Drury. My colleague, Deputy Murphy, was talking to you in relation to your relationship with Brian Cowen. Can I ask you in relation to your knowledge of Anglo Irish Bank, if the board of Anglo, or, indeed, an executive within Anglo, to coin a phrase, wanted access to the political ear, who would be the persons that they would approach?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But we do know that Anglo did engage with politicians at the most senior level. We know that you provided ... you were a conduit for some of that engagement in terms of the telephone call from Mr. FitzPatrick and in terms of the board meeting with the Minister for Finance and within a couple of weeks, would be the Taoiseach of the State. So in relation, if as I said, executives in Anglo or...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But hang on a second there, Mr. Drury, you've already testified to this inquiry that you were the conduit between Anglo Irish Bank and the board meeting which the Minister for Finance attended-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Sorry, well the dinner in Heritage House, which was made up of executives and members of the board, and also that you were the conduit in relation to the phone call. So the point you're making about never was you asked to do anything like that, it's coming against the evidence you've already testified to.