Results 23,301-23,320 of 35,893 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay but, yes, that was the major risk and the Financial Regulator understood ... accepted that as well. Can I ask ... you mentioned in your statement that you were also involved in IT systems and development of IT systems and this is an area that came under criticism from the internal audit report, I believe. There is mention in terms of the IT systems. Can you just clarify this for once...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But, like, I'm thinking ... I'm sure you've been in with like his office on many occasions. It's usually .... one of the most notable things you will see on anybody's desk is a computer. But in terms of a bank, and you’re looking at the reports, and you’re looking at all of the stuff, obviously, you’re looking at it on a screen. Was there ... you know, you were, sorry,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: We’re not talking about a corner shop here.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The point I’m making is, in terms of the systems - and this may seem a bit trivial and all that but I actually think it's not. Right - in terms of the systems, because you mention you were in charge-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----of IT systems.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: We’re not talking, as I was saying, about the wee corner shop, you know, that’s selling a couple of loaves of bread and a couple of pints of milk at the weekend. It is a €16 billion enterprise, where Mr. Fingleton ... report after report is saying - we know he was the chief lender - but report after report is how he was heavily involved in all aspects of the bank. Can...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Purcell, what do you say to those who accuse you of being Mr. Fingleton’s "Yes" man?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You don’t agree. In your view-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----and in your knowledge, from being there, from being secretary, from being chief financial officer, was ... had ... did Mr. Fingleton ever sanction a loan or ask somebody to provide a loan to an individual without it first going through the credit committee approval process or the board?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Are you aware, as we've seen in the Deloitte report, an internal report, where loan applications were actually made after loans were advanced to the customers?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Could I just ask this because you sat on the board? So one of the findings was, in Deloitte, that Mr. Fingleton was the individual who extended Stg£10 million of a loan on his own say, nobody else, and this was also backed up in terms of the independent internal review.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: When those findings were made, did the board investigate these findings and clarify whether that was the case or not, or did you just say, "That was a nice read and let’s move on to the next item on the agenda"?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What explanation did you receive?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat a Chathaoirligh agus fáilte, Mr. Drury. Can I begin maybe if we can get Vol. 1, page 15, of the books drawn up.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It'll be come up on your screen and I'll reference it anyway. It's the PAC report in July 2012 on the crisis into the domestic banking sector, and it noted, this is the quote, it says: Anglo had poor governance structures and procedures and risk controls during its period of high growth. Weaknesses in these areas were identified by auditors and regulators in 2003, 2006 and 2008. It goes...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Which one is accurate?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Which one is accurate? Did the regulator point out all of these deficiencies in 2003, 2006 and 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Were you satisfied as director of the bank, that as director of the bank you were provided with all the necessary information, and in particular, financial information necessary to fulfil your fiduciary responsibilities? Did you ever, ever have any concerns over the accuracy or timeliness of this information?