Results 23,201-23,220 of 35,893 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Fingleton, in the core documents of Vol. 1, again on page 5, it states that over the period 2001 to 2003, Nationwide increased its level of commercial lending by over 60%. This was a source of concern for the regulator, that the society did not have the appropriate skill sets or controls in place to effectively manage this exposure. On page 47 of the core booklet that you have in Vol....
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: To clarify, you say you don't, so you ... is it you don't believe it was appropriate but it was also a normal expansion, so which-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Inappropriate normal expansion is that what you're saying?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So it was appropriate?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Were you aware of the risks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But were you aware of the risks that existed with the fact that you put 81, 80% of your loan book in commercial property and 81% of land and development were in speculative-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I go to maybe - just in relation to the risk - again the core booklets, Vol. 2? It's on page 45 and this is Project Harmony, the report in June 2007, and it notes: The overall approach to risk assessment would not be described as highly developed given that the Group continues to rely heavily on the Managing Director, does not have sophisticated IT systems and operates across a limited...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can you explain why you considered such a modus operandito be fit for purpose for a financial institution with a balance sheet of €16 billion at the end of 2007?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you have a sophisticated ... do you dispute what the Project Harmony? For example, did you have a sophisticated IT system? It's reported that you never even had a computer yourself. I'm not sure if that's accurate or not. But was there a sophisticated IT system? Do you dispute what Project Harmony says in the report in June 2007?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You had €16 billion of a loan book, with respect, at the end of 2007.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Sorry, €16 billion was-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: At the ... yes, here, the balance sheet was €16 billion.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did that not require a computer, for example, for the managing director?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. So ... okay, I'll leave it at that. Can I ask you, in the letter from INBS, and again this is in core booklet, Vol. 3, page 41? This is a letter from INBS to the Financial Regulator's office in April 2008 and it's in response to the Regulator's query of February 2008 - its report on commercial property lending. The letter from INBS states: Mr. Fingleton is closely involved with the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes. Mr. Fingleton, in the core booklet - again Vol. 1, page 71 to 73 - this is a review by Deloitte in the second quarter of 2008 into your bank, Irish Nationwide, commercial and residential lending. It had the following to say with regard to critical issues. On page 71 of these documents it quotes: No Credit Committee approval was present on a number of reviewed files, mostly relating...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, that's fine. Just for clarity, you are disputing the Deloitte report, the Financial Regulator's report, Project Harmony's report in relation to-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----Deloitte's report, the Financial Regulator's letters in relation to your authority and the Project Harmony report? It's that just for accuracy purposes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I finally ask you ... in relation to ... INBS's overarching driver was demutualisation and sale and this is talked about in the Nyberg report. In your opinion, did the desire on the part of management, and on your part also as part of that management, to maximise the value of INBS result in the adoption of poor lending practice and an increased level of risk in the loan portfolio?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question is: did the fact that you wanted to sell ... the demutualisation and sale, did that result in your view, as part of the management to maximise the value of INBS ... did that result in the adoption of poor lending practices and an increase in the level of risk in the loan portfolio?