Results 23,161-23,180 of 35,893 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----the main reason decided by rating agencies for downgrading Irish banks was because of the dominant business model shared by the main Irish banks, that is, commercial and residence property loans funded through large degrees through wholesale markets that were mired in a sustained credit crunch. Would you have come across this perception in your day-to-day dealings? Was this or was this...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, by people that you dealt with externally.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Finally, can I ask you in relation to bondholders and the debate that has been going on and we have discussed this in the inquiry as well in relation to the burning of bondholders, what was the view, to the best of your knowledge, or were you aware of the view of people in the market as to whether, for example, subordinated bondholders should have been burned or whether senior...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You are not sure on what?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I think we can all agree with that.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Just to make the question a bit clearer, sorry, it's not about what should have happened on the night of the guarantee.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The NTMA had prepared a document - it would have been after your departure - but prepared a document in relation to the burning of subordinated and senior unguaranteed bondholders at the time when we went into the troika bailout. The question I was asking you, because this debate was still ongoing in a public way, was there ever a concern or expectation raised by those in the markets, people...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat agus fáilte chuig an choiste, tUasal Fingleton. Can I ask you, just following on from your last comment, what is it, exactly, you regret?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In your contribution you mentioned, for example, contributors or those who could stop the property bubble. You mentioned Lehman's, Bear Stearns - as instigators of the crisis - the regulator, the Central Bank, the Department of Finance, the Government, the ECB. In your view, where does Irish Nationwide and your role as the chief of Irish Nationwide, INBS, for the last 38 years ......
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Mr. Fingleton, we won't have time ... and I'm sure other members will have time to go through the whole history of Nationwide, but in terms of the specific question of the regret that you've expressed, what role did you play yourself in relation to where Irish Nationwide found itself basically lumped on the Irish taxpayer-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----and do you regret any decisions that you took or the way that you managed the bank in ... in ... to bring it to a point where it ultimately went bust?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Whose fault was it that the society had a commercial loan book that was too large?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But you don't regret that decision, as you've told us-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, so you do regret-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, we'll come back to the commercial property. Is there any other decisions, bar allowing your commercial property exposure to increase to significant levels, that you regret?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Fingleton, you were in charge of Irish Nationwide Building Society for 38 years. During that period, the bank made a series of business decisions that led to it eventually going bust and to be bailed out by billions of euro of taxpayer's money. In the annual accounts of Irish Nationwide Building Society, it was reported that a pension fund of €27.6 million had been set up...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Was there a bonus culture in Irish Nationwide?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No.