Results 23,041-23,060 of 35,893 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. We've heard testimony from ... from others in the committee, including Professor Honohan, which talks about the damage was done, you know, in the period running up to 2006 ... that period ... that when you were going into 2008, it was too late. Can you explain to me - and that was ... obviously ... coincides with the period when you were head of lending of Anglo Irish Bank for the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What does that mean - defend yourselves? Does that mean continue to give them money when you shouldn't have given them money?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Page 15 of Vol. 1 details the Public Accounts report of July 2012 on the crisis in the domestic banking sector and it notes:Anglo had poor governance structures and procedures and risk controls during its period of high growth. Weaknesses in these areas were identified by auditors and regulators in 2003, 2006 and 2008. ... Management showed a lack of awareness of risk and focused their...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The whole lot of it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. I'll have to start from the start because ... Do you understand what's in the PAC report in terms of the poor governance structure, the fact that the auditors and regulators identified weaknesses in these areas in 2003, 2006 and 2008, that the management, which you're part of, showed a lack of awareness of risk and focused their attention on business growth? And I'm asking you how do...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, we know that because the auditors identified ... the PAC revealed that the auditors identified weaknesses in 2003, 2006 and 2008. How come ... the point here is how come the statements of corporate governance every year in the bank's annual reports was giving you a clean bill of health basically?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Do you believe that the management showed a lack of awareness of risk and focused their attention on business growth?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. I want to refer to another book - sorry, if you just bear with me - Matt Cooper, Who Really Runs Ireland?I'm not sure if you are familiar with the book or not.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Matt Cooper's book, Who Really Runs Ireland?It's a book that he published. You're referenced or you're mentioned in the book along with Tiernan O'Mahony, both of you leaving a number of years after not being appointed to the top position. He talks about Tiernan O'Mahony writing in The Irish Timesas far back as 2002, saying the big days of 40% per share profits are over and it'll be more...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Fáilte to Mr. McGann chuig an coiste. Can I ask you just to start off with: in your opinion was the decision to combine the role of finance director and the chief risk officer prudent or appropriate at the time when the loans were growing rapidly, in terms of the need to maintain an independent risk function at the time, allocation needed ... and the time allocation needed for both...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, it wasn't prudent or appropriate, in hindsight. And, when this was discussed, was it discussed in detail? Was there ... this is quite an important change, a big change, was there discussions or was it just a rubber-stamping situation by the board?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Who proposed it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. Walsh, on page 2 of your statement, you say the unique combination of the freeze in liquidity and interbank lending, coupled with the huge deposit withdrawals, was not anticipated; its scale and reach impacted globally across the wide range of industry and commerce and not just banking. Now, one could argue that this is one view of the international context. Evidence presented to this...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So when agencies and those who advise investors were saying "sell, sell your shares in Anglo Irish Bank" as early as January 2008 because of the exposure, overexposure to commercial property and then seeing what was happening in the market and what was likely to happen in the future, how did the board respond to that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But you were being downgraded in early 2008-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----as a result of overexposure in property. We had the Financial Timesarticle, for example, in around the "St. Patrick's Day massacre", talking about Anglo Irish Bank being in the same boat as some of the other banks that had gone bust and run into trouble. So this wasn't a secret kind of conversation that was happening between the numbers. There was openly people ... large institutions...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What strategies did the board put forward to address the downgrades that were happening at that time, in early 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. McGann, we have seen evidence at this committee and ... you know, in terms of where all the banks seen themselves post-2008. It was a presentation, I think, either to the Central Bank or to the Department, and Anglo Irish Bank stood out because they expected to lend more during that period. They believed they were going to be highly profitable and so on and so forth. We have heard...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Do you regret not recognising at that point in time that the model may have been broke?