Results 20,361-20,380 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----that should not necessarily have been included in the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Would that have been credible? Would that have-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----given sufficient confidence to lenders?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Should Anglo have been allowed to fail at the end of September 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Is the Governor saying that that decision should have been made even with the information available at that time or is he saying it with the information we now have about the insolvency----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: And then liquidate so that we would not be talking about a disorderly failure, as the Governor referred to in his report? He is talking about a liquidation.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: The Governor says in the report that a disorderly failure of Anglo, which he said was systemic at the time, would have in all likelihood meant the other banks running out of cash within days. He is not talking there about a liquidation. He is saying if the Government had done nothing Anglo just could not continue in business.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: What, in the professor's opinion, is the main reason those involved in making the decision and the authorities and advisers did not know that Anglo was a busted flush, that it was insolvent at that time? Why did they not know that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Should they have known at that stage that Anglo was insolvent?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Who should have known?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: In the professor's opinion, was there a genuine belief at that time that Anglo's problems were short term in nature - cash flow, liquidity issues - that the underlying solvency of the bank was sound? Was that the genuine belief in September 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Nobody?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: When Professor Honohan talks about Monday, 29 September, on page 123, he says "it became clear that Anglo could not survive another day." Was the position that stark? Was it that imminent that Anglo, without any intervention, would be gone the following day?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: In the course of preparing his report, did Professor Honohan come across any evidence or example of anybody in the Central Bank or the Financial Regulator conveying a message to Government, privately or publicly, in writing or verbally, that this was heading for disaster - the unsustainable model of lending that the bank was engaging with, the over-exposure to one sector of the economy - did...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Professor Honohan said that there was a failure of regulation. Was that due to inadequate legislation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Inadequate resources?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: The allocation of resources.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Having said all of that, should we have been more prepared? There were clear warning signs in 2007 and in March 2008 of problems in the international banking system. Should we have been more prepared in terms of having resolution legislation prepared and ready to go in the event of something like what happened in September 2008 transpiring?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: Did Professor Honohan encounter any evidence of overt or covert pressure from political masters towards those in the authorities responsible for regulating the banks and those responsible for prudential supervision? Was an environment created where questioning of the model was unwelcome? Was there any evidence of direct contact where people were slapped down for raising issues or questions...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael McGrath: On page 7 of his report Professor Honohan says that in an important sense the major responsibility lies with the directors and senior management of the banks that got into trouble. It was not part of Professor Honohan's report to examine the role of the banks, but is that his view if he were to have a hierarchy of responsibility for causing the banking crisis?