Results 1,781-1,800 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And is there any further change that is required to put in place the ultimate culture or ultimate structure that AIB should have that you haven't currently put in place?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: ''Since 2011, the approach to risk management within the organisation has fundamentally changed''. That's a quotation from your opening statement. Credit assessment now focuses mainly on cash flows as a primary source of repayment with collateral considered as the secondary source. Could you explain why in your opinion this had not been the case before 2011?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: If risk appraisal had focused more on the cash flow analysis, would the impact of the crisis have been so severe on AIB?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In your opinion, in relation to the statement you made about the credit assessment being focusing mainly on cash flows as a primary source of repayment, if the appraisal, the risk appraisal, had focused more on cash flow ... analysis, would the impact and the crisis have been as severe on AIB?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Duffy, you hadn't taken up your position within AIB very long when you publicly stated that AIB would consider writing down loans, debt forbearance. In terms of debt forbearance, and a moral hazard between mortgage write-down and-or SME corporate write-down, could you just outline your view why you so quickly moved to that position?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Duffy, you are about to leave AIB. You are about to move to another jurisdiction, you are probably in a better position than most now to offer a view in relation to the establishment of NAMA. I am not sure if you have seen the transcripts from NAMA's evidence to the inquiry to date. Could I ask your view ... was the establishment of NAMA helpful or unhelpful towards the banking crisis?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: You are about to leave.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Since nationalisation of AIB, prior to you becoming CEO ... AIB, have they used external consultants for advice, outside of your own banking knowledge and expertise?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Have they ever used external consultants?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Do you have any ... do you have the knowledge of how much was spent on external consultants by AIB since nationalisation?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Millions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask what is a safe level of growth for a balance sheet, year on year, for a bank? Mr. Bill Black, when he gave evidence, said ... his term that he used was "grow like crazy" is 30%. AIB's figures from balance sheet growth from 2001 to 2008 was 29% year-on-year. What, in your view, is a safe level of growth?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: And Mr. Duffy, during the period from 2001 to 2008 which were the highest level of balance sheet growth by AIB, based upon the liquidity within AIB ... at the time I know it is before your time but I'm sure you must have done some analysis in relation to that period, what was your opinion upon the operation of the bank at that stage, outside of your opening statement?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: In terms of the bank guarantee, do you have an opinion on the bank guarantee? Again, I know it was before your time, but you are exiting I keep telling you - you are going soon. You may be able to offer an opinion. I think it is important that you are probably best placed to offer an opinion. You are CEO of what was the largest bank in the country and I do think it is important Mr. Duffy...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Do banks not make profits?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Just to finish, Chairman, the drive to keep up with a market share, to protect the franchise, there are terms ... a number of terms that have been used, can I ask your opinion in relation to the attempt to keep up with, potentially, another institution?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: From our terms of reference, going back to '91 to 2013.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Duffy, thank you again; I think we're nearly there now. At the start, you used the term "staggering": €21 billion Government guarantee; €20 billion de-leverage; €11.5 billion NAMA write-down; the sale of other assets and the shareholder loss. Was AIB badly managed prior to your takeover of the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Is that a "Yes" or a "No"?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Well, I've asked him "yes" or "no".