Results 15,881-15,900 of 16,492 for speaker:Ciarán Lynch
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: So that was one operational consideration that you, kind of, had this good bank-bad bank sort of thing. What other operational factors were considered at the time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: Right.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: So what would have been the consequences to the State in two regards? One, winding it down quickly - as you just kind of said, there were some concerns there, maybe you could tell us more? And what were the concerns in terms of actually keeping it going as a going concern?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: And was-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: At any time was it discussed that, look, we're ... the situation with Anglo is this is where it was, this is where it is now and this is where it needs to go and that, ultimately, where it needs to go is a wind-down, a liquidation or some removal of it from the financial landscape?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: And in that regard, it's the final question specifically on Anglo. In the way that the promissory note was structured, did it enable or help or assist or hinder the ultimate liquidation of the company?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: But inevitably-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: But inevitably if you're going to liquidate something, and we'd know from earlier testimony you ... that there's very particular structures for liquidation and, in this regard, there would be emergency legislation that'd been prepared over a period of time.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: So you would hit that junction point. So the question I'm asking you specifically is the way the promissory note was structured, was it assisting or hindering to that process?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: Okay. I just want to wrap up with a couple of matters there and to say you were in a similar kind of area with Deputy Murphy a few moments ago. I'll maybe just put the question to you. I know you came in in 2009. You came in after the banking guarantee had actually been put in place but you were dealing with the legacy issue of it in your capacity as an adviser. So maybe if I could start...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: Well, the fact is that a guarantee was put in place.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: So there's no counterfactual of there being no guarantee.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: There's a guarantee in place.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: So is it inevitable or not inevitable that you're entering a bailout programme by the particular design and structure of which the guarantee was put in place?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: What ... what was it-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: All right. But what we do know is ... you're advising us that the ECB didn't capitalise the banks, that the funding, in effect, was a form of quasi funding capital. But is it the case that, in reality, without that funding, the banks were dead, illiquid and insolvent?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: So in that regard, were the banks that were covered by the guarantee still solvent and therefore qualifying for ECB-ELA funding at the time of Minister Lenihan’s last letter to Mr. Trichet?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Ciarán Lynch: The ECB have a very specific interpretation and that was laid out in Mr. Trichet’s correspondence repetitively back to Mr. Lenihan.