Results 1,321-1,340 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (18 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Should the NTMA have offered that view to the Department of Finance?

Seanad: Order of Business (19 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: I wish to raise the issue of regional development, specifically with regard to IDA Ireland. As Members know, the local authorities now have an economic development role within their jurisdictions following the Local Government Reform Act 2014. I realise it is not easy to turn a tanker quickly, but the oil tanker that is IDA Ireland has been very slow and reticent in facilitating rural...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Professor Connor is very welcome. He has made strong statements about insolvency. Specifically, he said that Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society were insolvent at the time of the guarantee.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: How does that statement tally with the PricewaterhouseCoopers report that was issued immediately after the guarantee?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: In terms of the special resolution regime, we know from Mr. Peter Nyberg's evidence that the Department of Finance began thinking about the resolution regime in 2007 after Northern Rock. Many of us were unaware that the Department of Finance had even considered a special resolution regime. Should that have advanced?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Nyberg stated also that the Department of Finance brought the resolution regime to the Domestic Standing Group, DSG, and other institutions did not believe that this was a good idea. Can Professor Connor comment upon his evidence that the other institutions, the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank, believed that this was not a good idea following the Norther Rock debacle?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: In page 6 of Professor Connor's statement he says that Irish bank shareholders and share markets also pressurised bank management to pursue risky strategies; there was an expectation of rapidly increasing annual earnings and dividends in the absence of which share prices suffered relative to competitors and the bank risked becoming a takeover target. When he mentions Irish bank shareholders...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: In Professor Connor's presentation he spoke about high growth economies and that the investment from the very stable deposits flowed into Ireland on the basis that Ireland had the potential to be a high growth economy. Would that have been standard or unique in terms of very stable deposits moving towards a high growth economy?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: I welcome Professor Walsh. Will he outline his view in respect of some of the really important audits that occurred during the banking crisis? I specifically refer to the PwC report presented to the Minister for Finance prior to the introduction of the bank guarantee which indicated that the potential liability to the State in respect of Anglo and INBS was €5 billion. What is...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: I will amend the question a little. Professor Walsh is a university lecturer. If he was grading PwC's analysis of the institutions involved, what grade would he award?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (25 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: What is Professor Walsh's view on the PwC report that was commissioned after the guarantee had been introduced in order to evaluate its impact on the banks?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Is Mr. McWilliams satisfied that the Minister was on top of his brief when he was discussing those matters with him in early September?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Can I ask Mr. McWilliams about the telephone call he received from John Gormley? When was that? Was Mr. McWilliams in China at that stage?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Did Mr. McWilliams ask him?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: What was his response?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Did Mr. McWilliams get the impression from his conversations with two Ministers at a crucial time that there was an inability within-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: Was the ability available within the Department of Finance, the Central Bank, the Regulator's office-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (26 Feb 2015)

Michael D'Arcy: We touched briefly on the PwC analysis carried out on behalf of the Department of Finance. Did Mr. McWilliams have sight of any reports?