Results 1,221-1,240 of 6,295 for speaker:Michael D'Arcy
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I am sorry, but 11 days later they were nationalised.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: But Merrill Lynch said that they were financially sound.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: No.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Is there any particular reason the Central Bank financial stability reports ceased reporting on the extent to which property was over-valued after 2006?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Professor Honohan used the term "let us not frighten the horses", which, from what I am told, appears to have been the intention. Was that not contrary to the oversight role of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator? Was the role of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator not exclusively to ensure that if the horses needed to be scared they would be scared?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: It is important that on occasion that occurs.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Regling uses the term "moral courage to penalise" the authorities, the Central Bank and Financial Regulator. Would that term also apply to the body politic? I am speaking about Government and Opposition.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: What is Mr. Regling's view on where the greatest failings were? Who were the people with the most responsibility who could have had the largest impact upon what turned out to be an expensive day for the Irish taxpayers?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Regling conducted a fairly in-depth report. Does he have an opinion on where the greatest failings were? Were they with the banks' boards of directors, non-executive directors, executive directors, the authorities, or where, in his view?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: There is the issue of the large increase in the banks' balance sheets. Mr. Regling does single out the commercial aspect of that on page 6 of his report. We now know 190 people who were transferred into NAMA had tens of billions of euro - over 50% of the entire loan book. When I say 190 people I mean 190 individuals or corporate entities. Should that have been pulled up immediately?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The report ends immediately before the bank guarantee. The weekend before that, there was a liquidity crisis within a bank that was part of the IFSC, DEPFA, which was part of Hypo Real Estate. Did Mr. Regling or his report analyse the circumstances in the Irish authorities? What requests went to the Irish authorities regarding the circumstances of DEPFA?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: He did not, even though there was a request made to the Irish authorities for aid of some nature?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The report does not deal with NAMA, but can I ask Mr. Regling's view on the attempted solutions subsequent to his report - the establishment of NAMA? It is a follow-on from the question. There is an Irish saying that "if I was going somewhere I would not start from here."
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: What are Mr. Regling's views on the attempted solutions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Mr. Regling quotes the Reinhard and Rogoff book, "This Time is Different". Am I correct in saying that, in terms of the Irish crisis, it was not different but was the same as every other property bubble internationally for centuries?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: The question I have is----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Just to finish the question----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: I welcome Professor Lane and thank him for coming. I would like to refer to the significant credit flows that came in, not immediately after we joined the euro but a couple of years afterwards. There was a slight slowdown or recession when the dotcom bubble burst. What were the significant factors underlying the major increase in the banks' balance sheets in the era that was mentioned by...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Would I be correct in saying Professor Lane's view is that the improvement in our weightless economy prior to 2002 was a genuine national increase of abilities and an increase in our GDP?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (21 Jan 2015)
Michael D'Arcy: Professor Lane made the point in his initial piece that non-EU areas or non-eurozone jurisdictions also went through a property increase, in effect. I would like to ask about the ability of the Irish banks to raise additional funds. I am not just thinking about bonds. I am thinking specifically about bank properties that were sold to pension funds before being rented back. How would...