Results 1,201-1,220 of 4,168 for speaker:Susan O'Keeffe
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Between 2004 and 2006, which Professor Honohan regards as the crunch time when things started to unravel, if regulation had occurred at that stage perhaps things might have changed. It seems to me that at the very time when banks became more aggressive in selling loans and credit became cheaper and more plentiful, regulation became less efficient and there was less interference or...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: In other words, we had a failing regulatory system for quite some time.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: It is repeatedly stated that nobody saw that it was a solvency crisis. That cannot be because everyone was stupid or not paying attention. What role did the banks and their advisers play in concealing their own solvency problems? How did that contribute?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Nobody saw the solvency crisis. That is extraordinary. What role might the banks have played in that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Page 7 of the report states that it would have been known in the Financial Regulator's office that intrusive demands from line staff could be and were set aside after direct representations were made to senior regulators. That is a very serious statement. Were those representations in the form of what we would describe as posh dinners, golf outings and brown envelopes, followed up by the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: What would the phone calls be on foot of? One does not call somebody to make a representation unless there is already a relationship, which may have been forged somewhere else in the social arena.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Yes, indeed.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: To which people would say-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: The public would say that was the sort of cosy club arrangement.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Page 8 of the report refers to the management of the big banks tolerating a change in the "lending standards, including decisions to authorise [a] numerous exceptions to stated policies". I would suggest it was not that the management of the big banks tolerated that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Yes, they encouraged it. Did they not incentivise their own staff with financial rewards for the larger loans they put out?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Finally, you said earlier that no one in the room on the night of the bank guarantee quite knew how bad the banks were, particularly Anglo Irish Bank. However, you might not have been aware of back channels of communication between the individuals concerned, as well as private documentation and knowledge. Is it reasonable or correct to say that no one in the room knew? It is an...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: May I seek clarification?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Was the Department of the Taoiseach represented on the-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Did anyone, either inside or outside the Central Bank, attempt or succeed in toning down the Governor's report?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: The Governor states on page 10 of his report that in the 2007 FSR there was internal evidence available to the contrary. The Governor says there was internal evidence that was evidently not put into that. Is that internal evidence, which the Governor has obviously seen, still available?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: What the Governor said is quite serious. We have talked about toning down in the broader sense but the Governor specifically states in the report that there was internal evidence that said X while the FSR said Y, meaning they were polls apart.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: Given all the failings of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator, the lack of prudence and lack of management and oversight, no one has resigned and no one was asked to resign. What does the Governor think about that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Context Phase (15 Jan 2015)
Susan O'Keeffe: There is a difference between learning lessons and being held accountable. That is what we are here for. If we do not hold people to account across the board - I do not mean in one particular place - then we are failing.