Results 11,301-11,320 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. As you know, Mr. Ahearne, about €15.5 billion in total of losses were imposed on junior bondholders - subordinated bondholders. Much of this was done through liability management exercises where debt holders were asked to voluntarily sell their debt back to the banks at reduced price. Was that seen as being an entirely different issue to the senior bondholders at that time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: The promissory note structure that was put in place back in 2010, can you explain the logic behind that structure at the time - an overall commitment of over €30 billion, over €3 billion to be paid every year for ten years or so? Can you explain why that structure was put in place and what, in your view, were the advantages of doing it that way from the State's point of view?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: But the State would still have to come up with the cash of €3 billion every year - every March.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. How did Minister Lenihan react to the letter from Jean-Claude Trichet of 19 November 2010, which really left nothing to the imagination that emergency liquidity assistance would only be maintained if the Irish State applied for a bailout?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: In the article you contributed to the book on Brian Lenihan: In Calm and Crisis, on page 25, you mention that Mr. Lenihan discovered that senior people at the ECB were briefing market sources that the ECB was considering the withdrawal of financial support to Irish banks. So again, this would have been in November 2010. Can you elaborate on that? What was he hearing? What was he referring...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Can I raise the issue of NAMA, Mr. Ahearne? And you have addressed it in your witness statement and you are strongly supportive of the NAMA project. But can I put a counter-argument to you, that the NAMA project crystallised immediately losses of €42 billion on the books of the banks, which triggered a massive round of recapitalisation? Subsequently, NAMA sold on the assets...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes, but it meant that those losses had to be fully recognised at the bottom of the market.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: So, okay, the losses were there vis-à-vis the actual value of the assets.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: But if they had been allowed to work them out over time, as opposed to NAMA doing it, then the outcome may have been different.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. Mr. Ahearne, I'd just like to quote an extract from Ajai Chopra's witness statement which will be put into evidence and to ask you a question and I know you haven't ... you haven't seen it before. He said:It is understandable that there is a strong sense in Ireland that burden sharing between Irish taxpayers and bank creditors has been unfair. In late 2010,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. And, finally, to what extent, Mr. Ahearne, was the failure to get to the bottom of the black hole in the Irish banks over the course of 2010, when there were various statements about the likely overall bill ... is it the case that the markets eventually lost confidence in our ability to get to the bottom of that black hole and lost patience in that? How significant a role did that...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes. Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. Good afternoon, Mr. Gray. Just if I can take you to that letter of 25 September '08 addressed to Mr. Kevin Cardiff, and you have spoken about this at length so we should be able to get through these questions quite quickly. There weren't any terms of reference for that paper, I think you've confirmed that. It was your own initiative following the discussion...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: And that's all set out in the paper.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: And just to clarify, in preparing this paper on that evening, you didn't consult with anybody else?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, and the recipients were Mr. Hurley, Mr. Cardiff, to whom it was addressed, and the ... David ... is that David Doyle?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: So he was sent a copy as well.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure, and apart from the Central Bank authority meeting, which informed your decision to write this paper, did you have any direct discussions before writing this or, indeed, after this ... after writing it, with Mr. Doyle and Mr. Hurley about this paper?