Results 11,221-11,240 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: And what was the immediate impact of it on your operations and on the funding and liquidity side of the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: And, on the broadly blanket nature of the guarantee, did you believe that it was too broad? Had you any views at the time and what is your current view of the appropriateness of the bank guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. The State ultimately ended up injecting €4 billion into Irish Life and Permanent: €1.3 billion was recouped with the sale of Irish Life and a further €500 million or so in the recent restructuring. The net cost is still north of €2 billion, as I understand it.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Given that Permanent TSB didn't go into the whole area of speculative property lending, land banks and development finance, how did it end up costing €4 billion? Was it the collapse in property prices? Can you explain, from your point of view, and I know you were gone in early 2009-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Property prices fell dramatically in '09 and '10 but, from where you were sitting, on your departure did you foresee that the cost could be so great of rescuing Irish Life and Permanent?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: But where could the losses have come from? Can you just rationalise it? You know-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: So it would have been driven by loan impairments, additional provisioning-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----stress testing-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. And you said that 85% of the ... was it the group assets-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----were accounted for by residential mortgages?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: What were the other 15%, broadly-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----of the asset base?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Can you just explain how the loan-to-deposit ratio reached a mouth-watering 275%? And, in the context of the fact that the funding mix ... if you look at the graph on Vol. 1, page 121, which looks at '06, '07, late '07, March '08, and the composition of the funding mix remains broadly stable, with long-term debt being, you know, 20-odd per cent; securitisation, 7%, 8%, 9%; deposits,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----because the lending was-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Michael McGrath: Why was it so out of step with the other financial institutions in terms of the loan-to-deposit ratio? It was way out on its own.