Results 11,221-11,240 of 36,274 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The question I was asking as well is: what's your opinion of the Central Bank's knowledge at the time when you ... when you took up office? Where do you think ... what type of knowledge do you think that they had gained at that point?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. And what's your opinion regarding the clarity of roles and accountability amongst the regulatory supervisory institutions and the State and the Department of Finance?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. And that's something that Governor Honohan has raised before, before Oireachtas committees here in this House. Mr. Roux, can I refer to the core booklet, Vol. 1, page 26. I'll read out the section and it's very short. It's headed "Examples of Interactive Engagement". It says "Based on a review of [the] sample of board papers during 1992, 1995 and 2000, we have not identified...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: These papers talk about that there's ... that there was none of them escalated, they were all dealt with "interactive engagement based on moral suasion". How common would that be from your experience in other jurisdictions?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you just to-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you just to, finally, in terms of light-touch regulation, I'm not sure if you're aware of it. It's an issue I have raised in the House before. One of the companies that you regulate, on their website promoted that they were basing a facility which provided light-touch regulation without the costs of an offshore entity, without the ... or a tax haven without the costs of a...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Cathaoirligh agus fáilte romhat, tUasal O'Connell. Can I ask you first, after the 2004 we had the IMF, the OECD and ECOFIN all clearly recommended a tighter fiscal stance, and the building of a "cushion" for the time when income from property-related transactions would fall. Can you tell us why, in your opinion, the Central Bank's recommendations to the Minister...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And did you appreciate that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: It's interesting that you talk about assumptions. Can you ... can you clarify maybe your role. As chief economist of the Central Bank of Ireland, would it be a case where they, you know ... these types of statistics are available to the public, they're published by the Revenue. I'm not sure if they were at that time but I know at this stage they're published by the Revenue quarterly....
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: I'm interested in just what the ESRI and ... sorry, the IMF, OECD and ECOFIN was saying in relation to property-related transactions. And when you were chief economist ... obviously, under your position of chief economist, you had the number of divisions, one of them would have been statistics - wouldn't that be ... that'd be correct - economic analysis and monetary policy and fiscal...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And why, given that these bodies were asking for a cushion, did you ... did you decide not to look into this issue?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is this not a kind of ... a kind of core area of financial stability if there's a threat to a major source of income to the State being ... being evaporated over a short period of time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes. I'm not sure if the IMF, the OECD and ECOFIN were all warning about property-related transactions or, for example, VAT-related transactions. I think the question really is ... is what did you do after being prompted by external agencies in relation to this matter? But you're confirming that you didn't carry out any research, or you didn't ask for any research to be carried out, until...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Can I ask-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In your statement you mention that at least one person on the board who was seriously concerned about the financial crisis ... and I'm not asking you ... and I'm asking you not to name the individual, but can you elaborate on the events that you remember in relation to that case?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What year are we talking about?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And you were at the meeting?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you offer an opinion at the meeting?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: When we have a board member saying that this was going to collapse like a house of cards, is that not your prompt? As you were saying, that you were trying to get this message out for such a long time ... you're at the board meeting, one of the board members has said "This is going to collapse like a house of cards" ... is this not like the doors opened?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Are you aware of any other contrarian voices inside the Central Bank or IFSRA and can you outline some examples? Again without mentioning names.