Results 10,861-10,880 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. Mr. Drury, you're very welcome. Can I ask why the witness statement you provided, in advance, is so short? You provided a three-page statement; it strikes me as very short.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. If I can take you back to the issue of exceptions to group lending policy - and a number of the questioners raised it already - and, on page 3 of Vol. 2, there is an extract from a report prepared by the IBRC special liquidator, and Deputy Higgins has already referred to this. And at the bottom of it, it makes it clear-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes, page 3.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: That, essentially, 92%, in value terms, of the Anglo loans transferred across to NAMA at their origin were, essentially, an exception to credit policy. And there are various references in the document to the different levels of exceptions. But I have to ask the question: what is the purpose of a credit policy being in place if it's going to be breached so extensively and so regularly by the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. And, whatever about breaching the bank's own internal credit policies or guidelines, the fact that the Central Bank had a single sector exposure limit of 200% of the bank's own funds, and Anglo's exposure to real estate business sector, was 588%. So-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----it was three times the limit.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: And would you have been aware of that? Would the board have been aware of that-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----Central Bank limit?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: So, to your knowledge, the board was not informed that Anglo's exposure to property was almost three times the Central Bank limit.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can you explain to me the role of the credit committee? You were on the risk committee and you chaired that for a short time.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: The credit committee appeared not to have any non-executive directors as members. Is that correct? It was a management-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. But you do say in your statement that the risk and compliance committee, of which you were a member, was the committee that the detail of different loans would be considered. So what was the role of that committee in lending?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.