Results 10,801-10,820 of 36,274 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I ask you ... and I'm just going to refer to Bank of Ireland C3b and it's on page 30 and it goes on for a number of pages. And this is a telephone conversation that was recorded in the trading room of Bank of Ireland and a transcript of it has been provided to the committee. It's between a Mr. Tilson and a "Mick'' and it was on the morning of 30 September 2008 at quarter past...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The head of global markets at the time would have been?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But ... sorry, who was the head of global markets at the time?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Right. Okay. Okay, can I just say ...say to you ... so this is the response ... this is the conversation that taking place within the bank at the time between Mr. Tilson and Mick and it says:MR. TILSON: Good morning Mick. MICK [replies]: Well it's all over. MR. TILSON: Absolutely. MICK: Its all sorted. Mr. TILSON: All done. Magic wand. MICK: I mean, Jesus I would nearly feel like...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, I'll ask you now just because ... this was immediately, as I said, on the morning of the guarantee. Mr. Tilson goes on to say: Never mind anything with a Government guarantee. MICK: Yes, but [even if you were to] ... even if you get the -- let us say you get out and you take billions. MR. TILSON: Yes. MICK: Right, and it's ... it is Government guaranteed etc.,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Finally Mr. Burrows, on the night of the guarantee it has been suggested in the evidence here, through a note that Mr. Sheehy, I believe, dictated, but it's been suggested in evidence here that there was a draft statement prepared by Government which had an attestation from the Financial Regulator that all the financial institutions were solvent and the system was solvent, and that was...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes. A draft statement that was going to contain a formula of words attesting to the solvency of the financial system and the financial institutions which was ... which AIB had raised concerns about.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Sorry, that was ... I appreciate that but that wasn't the question. The question I have for you is: were you party to any discussions in relation to a statement that Government were suggesting that would include a statement saying that the financial ... all the financial institutions were solvent and that AIB raised issues with this, and the statement was deleted?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And did you only give ... did you only give a view in relation to the solvency of Bank of Ireland or did you offer a view in relation to the solvency of other financial institutions on that night?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Is that a "No"? Just can I clarify if that was a "No"?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So, is that a "No" to the question I asked, that you did not offer an opinion on the solvency of any other financial institution on the night?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, agus fáilte roimh an bheirt. I want to just pick up on where Joe was asking Mr. O'Rourke a question. And you mentioned that you failed to see the property bubble bursting. You went to conferences. Demographics and so on were given as an example of why it would be a soft landing. You're not alone and we've had many witnesses before the committee...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And I'm not suggesting that it did. I'm just asking-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. And so if you had seen the crash coming, you would still have audited the accounts of AIB in exactly the same way or-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Did the firm perform any stress testing as part of the external audit of the bank to take into account the correlation between different types of property being financed - residential, commercial, development land and speculative land banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did the firm ... did your firm carry out any stress tests?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. You didn't feel it necessary to carry out your own stress tests?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In relation to unenforceable securities, in your audits of AIB, did you notice the fact that there were loans that had unenforceable securities?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Did you?