Results 10,721-10,740 of 26,610 for speaker:David Cullinane

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Can Mr. Carville give me the hourly breakdown for each partner, director, associate director, manager, supervisor and senior accountant? Are those figures publicly available?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: What is available and what is not available?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: A lot of this information is now the public domain. It has been put on the record of the Committee of Public Accounts. This goes back to a statement made by the Chairman earlier. Why is Mr. Carville not in a position to answer some of the other questions that were asked?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: The legal advice that Mr. Carville has received-----

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: I would like to make another observation. The Department has committed to go back to seek further legal advice. Part of the problem here is that what we get in general terms is a synopsis of the legal advice, which is that these legal issues cannot be dealt with. The parameters of what can and cannot be discussed are never set out for us. We would then have a view that there might be some...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: The problem for us is that many of us have spent a substantial amount of time dealing with what is a distraction that we should not have to deal with. The bodies of the chapters are quite substantial and we have not had, in my view, a fair opportunity to even probe them because we have spent so much time going over and back in respect of this issue. That is problematic. I am going to park...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: That is fine. I will turn to the substantive issue. The gross cost of capitalising the banks, according to the Comptroller and Auditor General's office, is €66.8 billion, the net cost to the State is €39.9 billion and there is an average cost of between €1 billion and €1.4 billion a year to service the associated debt. These are the headline figures in the...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Why were the banks not nationalised before the crash?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: There was never any legal requirement. I am asking what was the rationale for not nationalising any of these banks. Were they profitable banks before the crash?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Is it fair to say that the vast majority of banks that were operating in this State, certainly the Irish-owned banks, were profitable before the crash? What I am asking is why the Department did not at that point consider nationalising them. What was the rationale for that? Why did the Department not consider it?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: It was a policy decision. However, after the crash there was a decision to nationalise them, which came on the back of the bank guarantee. As a consequence of having to recapitalise the banks by investing so much in the banks, the quid pro quowas that the State would become a shareholder and, essentially, would own the banks de facto. That was a consequence of the policy decision that was...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: We took a decision to nationalise the banks when the banks were broke, essentially, or insolvent.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: A policy choice was made to nationalise what were broken banks.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Most were. Were those institutions public or private institutions? When they were nationalised, they were private organisations.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: How many other private organisations at that time were the subject of what Mr. Carville is calling stabilisation measures? How many private companies did not go to the wall because they were bailed out by the State, other than the banks?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: It was public money. Obviously, Mr. Carville would know about the banks because it is within his remit and the State would have had to bail them out. Other than the banks, is Mr. Carville aware of any other private institutions that were bailed out by the State and got taxpayers' money?

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Of course not. Those companies went to the wall because that is what happens. They went to the wall and they were not bailed out by the State. People lost their jobs and people who invested in those companies lost. However, a different attitude was taken to the banks. It goes back to something Mr. Carville said earlier when asked the logic of this. He said he shuddered to think what...

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Half of it.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Was that a systemic bank? Was it a high street bank? Could we put it on par, for example, with Bank of Ireland or Allied Irish Banks? I am not sure if anyone in this room was a customer of Anglo Irish Bank. I certainly was not. It was seen pretty much as a developer's bank and an investor's bank, more than a high street bank for ordinary customers.

Public Accounts Committee: 2016 Annual Report and Appropriation Accounts of the Comptroller and Auditor General
Chapter 3 - Cost of Bank Stabilisation Measures as at the end of 2016
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Liquidation (14 Dec 2017)

David Cullinane: Therefore, when Mr. Carville said he shuddered to think what would have happened if we had not taken that decision, it might hold some logic for a fraction of the €66.8 billion that was spent but, for the majority, it would have made no difference. If Anglo had been left to go to the wall and the State did not take up the liabilities, I fail to see how that would have been problematic...