Results 10,061-10,080 of 26,053 for speaker:Kieran O'Donnell
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: You wouldn't have seen any reason why either of those institutions couldn't have been nationalised on the night of the guarantee?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Welcome Mr. O'Flynn, at the late hour.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. O'Flynn, based on your dealings with the Irish banks in the pre-crisis period, did you get the general impression that the ... maintaining and growing market share was the dominant driver in lending practices? And did you observe increasing competition between them for businesses with you and your company?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And looking at appendix 2 in your ... in your ... page 7, you dealt with eight banks in the first pie chart and over 50% of loans for the O'Flynn Group were held with Anglo alone, from what I can see. And, can you explain why that level of debt was held with Anglo above the other banks? The ... AIB, you dealt with Bank of Ireland, AIB, Bank of Scotland, First Active, Lombard and a couple of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: So the Anglo loans were basically for UK investments?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: UK and Europe, not Irish?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And did you find that the banks, did the banks come to you looking for loans? Did they hustle you for loans, in essence?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And the level of gearings that the banks were willing to accept, did you see a slippage in that up to 2008 over those years?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Well, I suppose I'm referring to ... to page 19 of your appendices, and you give two graphs. You give the O'Flynn Group, the value-to-debt ratio at 30 September '08 and on the face of it, Mr. O'Flynn, it would seem that the debt gearing levels were very high.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: You didn't find any one of the banks more aggressive than the other?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And what do you-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And what would you regard as a sustainable debt-to-value ratio now?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Now. No, wait, both.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: And what would think should be the ... going forward, what would you feel is a sustainable level?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Based on your expertise in that area.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: Okay. In the pre-crisis period, same period, did you or your management colleagues believe at any point that there was a property bubble was in the making, or did you generally rely on the soft landing theory?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Jul 2015)
Kieran O'Donnell: When you say "price increases", are you saying in land?