Results 9,741-9,760 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can you comment, Mr. O'Reilly, on the rapidly expanding balance sheets of the banks and was there a requirement, as a result of much more intrusive supervision, than what they actually experienced from the regulator for the period '03 to '06? Why did you not embark on more stringent intervention in light of this?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. You're very welcome, Mr. Patterson. Can I just start by asking you, apart from the publication of the financial stability reports over a number of years, how did the Central Bank and IFSRA ensure that the Government was at all times well informed about the macroeconomic situation and ... and trends?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. You said that, in your role as chairperson of the board, a non-executive position, you'd find yourself in the building or in the office one or two days a week. Typically, how many hours work a week would being the non-executive chairman of the board involve?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: So ten to 20 hours a week maybe?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Something like that. And, was there a fee attaching then to ... to the position?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: And how much was that say, for 2006 or '7?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Just on the issue of the powers that the Financial Regulator had, it strikes me that there is something of a difference between what you said verbally and what's in your ... your written report, and, you indicated a ... a change in your thinking. Was that a very recent change in your thinking, that the ... that the Financial Regulator did have adequate powers to intervene?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. Because your written statement in section 1.2, which starts on page 3, it makes a number of points about powers, that you didn't have ... that the regulator, sorry, didn't have the power, for example, to disapprove of specific products like 100% mortgages. You make the point about foreign banks which are passported in here and you didn't ... the regulator didn't want to disadvantage...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure. But, in preparing your statement ... and over recent months, you had the benefit of the official reports which were published and they dealt quite comprehensively with the issue of the powers available to the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank and yet you kind of left the issue of powers hanging there in your statement. It wasn't entirely clear.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. The annual financial stability reports ... you make, I think, quite an important point that, in a sense, it almost had to be sanitised because of the risk of stoking fear or spooking the horses, as you put it. But doesn't that go to the very heart of the integrity of the document? I mean, you said earlier on that the financial stability report didn't reflect the concerns of board...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Sure, but I would put it to you, Mr. Patterson, that the words contained in the report were very important. People relied on that report. Businesses might have made investment decisions on the basis of the Central Bank's assessment, that the fundamentals were strong, there would be a soft landing, that there are risks but they are manageable. You know, individuals were reading the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: This probably would have been 2006 or '07. And I remember voices in the board saying "No, we can't say that because, if we do, we will bring about the very thing we're trying to avoid".
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: But would it have been better to not publish a report at all, rather than publish a report that didn't reflect the concerns of board members?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: But I would put it to you, Mr. Patterson, that people don't expect the Central Bank to be engaging in spin.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: I didn't say-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: I didn't say that there were lies involved, but, I mean, you've made what I would regard as quite a significant statement, that the financial stability report didn't reflect the concerns of board members.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: Of all board-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)
Michael McGrath: But there was an overriding requirement or a feeling of necessity to, in a sense, dilute, water down any major concerns-----