Results 9,561-9,580 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Just to be clear, Mr. Hurley, in his witness statement, stated "The Central Bank agreed the content of the Financial Stability Reports with the Financial Regulator." In the foreword, for example, of the 2007 report, he said "This Report reflects the joint views of the Bank and the Financial Regulator ..." Did you essentially sign off on the financial stability report every year?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Well, do you think in any sense that until now, in your evidence, you might have sought to deflect some of the responsibility in terms of the financial stability report entirely onto the Central Bank and not reflected the joint nature of that report, which is clearly evidenced in Mr. Hurley's statement and in the report themselves?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: I'll give you an opportunity to express your view-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: -----because earlier on you were referring, a number of times, to "their assessment" and "the Central Bank's assessment". The reports were clearly joint reports.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: I suppose the key question that arises from that is: did you also miss the financial stability risk posed to the financial system by the lending practices of the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes, that's not a very direct answer, Mr. Neary. I mean, for example, the 2007 report, published in November '07, financial stability report, concluded ... the overall conclusion is that "The Irish financial system's shock-absorption capacity remains robust and the system is well-placed to cope with emerging issues", November 2007.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: You signed up to and, presumably, concurred with that conclusion. So, my question again is, along with the Central Bank, did the Financial Regulator miss the financial stability risks posed to the financial system by the lending practices of the banks?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: On the question of resources, was it open to you, as CEO, to reallocate your existing resources from, say, the prudential supervision side, where you had 210 people in 2007, to the banking supervision side, where you had 48 people in 2007?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Just to clarify one final point, Mr. Neary, and I think it's important from an evidential point of view, Mr. Horan's statement yesterday that he made formal proposals in August '05 for higher capital charges for high loan-to-value mortgages were not accepted as they were not considered by senior management in the CBFSAI to be necessary. Subsequently, they were implemented, in 2006,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: So, at that time, in the autumn of '05, those proposals didn't make it to the level of the board?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: February '06, yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Neary.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you very much, Chair. Mr. Neary, can you explain why the audits and other forms of analysis undertaken by the Central Bank and Financial Regulator failed to identify the looming issues that emerged in 2008 and '09?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Did the Financial Regulator ever assess worst-case contingency scenarios of a systemic bank failure? And, given the warning signals from Northern Rock onwards in mid-2007, why did the regulator not undertake such a contingency assessment?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Chairman, I'd like to quote some of the comments from Judge Martin Nolan at the conclusion of a criminal case last year, which has been widely reported-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: And the case was widely reported in the media.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, thank you. Mr. Neary, the comments you made on "Prime Time" on 2 October 2008, were they representative of the views that you would have expressed to the decision makers three nights previously on 29 September 2008?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay, but on the night in question, on the 29th, did you express the opinion to the decision makers that, in your view, the banks were solvent?