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Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: But you would, Mr. Moran, at the time ... there would have been various bodies stating that that level of housing output was unsustainable.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: But ... but you weren't ... the question was, were you not looking at the analysis to come in at a level that was sustainable? You were going down to 50,000 units and you said, for every 10,000 units you'd lose €1.7 billion. The question is, did you not look at levels of 25,000, 30,000, which are the sustainable levels, right?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: But I would have thought, if that was the average, but ... but you ... I suppose, Mr. Moran, that, did you not look at below that level?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Why not?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: In hindsight, should you have?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: In-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: And when you were doing the budget, on an annual basis, you'd normally, I presume, build in something into the modelling that would take account of, on a conservative basis, if there was a possible fall in housing output? What figures did you build into those budget protections? Ten thousand?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: That was only 6,000 per annum.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Was that not, on looking back now ... was that not very, very conservative, in terms of, sorry ... I sort of ... that's not the word I'm looking ... because if it was conservative it would be a lot more ... was that not very much erring on the side of being very optimistic?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Okay. Can I just, one final thing Chairman? Page 9, you said, "Finance Departments are by their very nature fiscally conservative." You said, "The Department had been warning of the risks to the Budget and the economy for nearly a decade before the eventual crisis hit in 2008." How were you doing that because clearly it wasn't coming through in terms of the budgets? How were you doing...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: In the one area that was under your direct responsibility, the area of tax incentives, why wasn't the horse pulled up much earlier in terms of the incentives, the tax incentives for property? They were due to end the end of 2004, they ended up going out until four years later, 31 July 2008. How did that arise, Mr. Moran?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: That was six years before they were due to end.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: But it was an area that you would have been responsible for at the time and the review didn't start until 2005, and it was extended in the budget of 2004 by further up to the end of 31 July 2006. So finally, can you explain to me was it a political decision that the reviews didn't take place earlier?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Would you say at the time there was lack of political will to actually look at-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (18 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Was there lack of political will at the time to finish these schemes at the end of 2004?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Mr. McCarthy, in 2005-06, the Minister was advised that the country was, depending ... the Minister for Finance ... depending on unsustainable tax revenues. How robustly was the Minister challenged on the tax and spending policies implemented, and what contingency plans were put in place by the Department to deal with the problems which were envisaged? And I note you've made references to...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: David Doyle in his interview to the Wright report, the then General Secretary, this was the basis of this comment. You might ... Just to continue, sorry.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Did you look for, in your role as an economist in the Department ... did you look for ... that the tax incentive schemes around housing ... the various tax incentive schemes, that they would be discontinued earlier? They were due to finish at the end of 2004; they didn't finish until July 2008. Did you specifically in your role as an economist in the Department look that they should be...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: But you did a report on housing.

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