Results 9,281-9,300 of 27,945 for speaker:Michael McGrath
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. And were you involved in the decision to make additional disclosure in the 2008 financial statements as regards the exposure of EBS to development and property for example? There is disclosure there, significantly above and beyond what was there in 2007. Was that a decision of the directors? Or, was it a decision that you encouraged or advised would be made in the course of the...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Just a final area I’d like to touch on, Mr. Fitzgerald, is IAS 39, which has come up time and time again in terms of impairment provisioning. It is to tease out the wriggle room, if any, that you would have as an auditor in advising directors how to make provisions in accordance with IAS 39. My question for you is whether the application of IAS 39 is absolutist as such or...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. What the regulations state, as I read them, is "In the extremely rare circumstances in which management concludes that compliance with a requirement in a standard or an interpretation would be so misleading that it would conflict with the objective of financial statements set out in the Framework, the entity shall depart from that requirement in the manner set out in paragraph 18 if...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: It is provided for in the regulations.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: It does say "extremely rare circumstances". My question is ... is really asking you to confirm ... it isn't necessarily specific to the audits you did, but that, and you mentioned it earlier on, the IAS 39, no more than any other accounting standard, is not absolutist in nature and that, while the discretion is extremely narrow, the auditor does have some discretion to depart from a standard...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: But in certain circumstances, an auditor could interpret that requirement as giving him or her scope to depart from the strict interpretation of an accounting standard, if they felt that was necessary for the financial statements to give a true and fair view.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Didn't arise.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (20 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you, Mr. Fitzgerald.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Thank you Chair, you are very welcome, Mr. Hurley. Can I start by asking you in relation to the Honohan report which pointed out that, prior to the financial crisis in 2008, there were no sanctions imposed on credit institutions and none that might be said to have reflected significant prudential concerns. Can you comment on why, in your view as then Governor, as distinct from regulator, no...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Okay. Professor Honohan examines in detail in his report the separation of the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank, and he arrives at the following conclusion, "Though few would now defend the institutional structure invented for the organisation in 2003, it would be hard to show that its complexity materially contributed to the major failures that occurred." Do you agree with this...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Mr. Peter Nyberg, when he examined the role of the Central Bank pre-crisis, he concluded: "As in the case of the [Financial Regulator] there was a major domestic policy failure at the [Central Bank] in respect of the maintenance of financial stability." Do you agree?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: And what share of the responsibility for that does the Central Bank bear?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Is that a minority share of responsibility? Is it the primary share of the responsibility for the major domestic policy failure in respect of the maintenance of financial stability?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Were you the essential guardian of financial stability?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: But if you were the primary guardian of domestic financial stability, and you accept that there was a major policy failure, then are you accepting primary responsibility?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: The 2003 Act, Mr. Hurley, set out very clearly in section 26, it inserted a new section 33D in the principal Act, giving the Governor or the board the power to issue guidelines to the regulatory authority and those guidelines had to be complied with by the Financial Regulator. So is it the case that you, as Governor of the Central Bank, had the power to issue guidelines to the Financial...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Where does it say that?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Can I just clarify, Mr. Hurley, are you saying that the Act put constraints or limits on the guidelines that you as Governor could issue to the Financial Regulator?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (21 May 2015)
Michael McGrath: Is that in the Act?