Results 8,281-8,300 of 26,043 for speaker:Kieran O'Donnell

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: You are familiar with it.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Taking that context, Mr. Sheehy, at the end of 2008, you were far in excess. You were breaching the guidelines on one sector, we'll say, which should have been 200%, you were at 275%. The two sectors should have been at 250% and you were at 390%. Was the regulator in agreement with this, satisfied with this?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: You were getting to the top of the hill?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: No, I'm asking how did the regulator view that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: There are two questions, Mr. Sheehy.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: No. 1-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: -----why you breached it-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: -----and, No. 2, what view did the regulator take?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Should you have breached the limits?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: And can you explain, Mr. Sheehy, why, under your tenure, between '05 on, your development loans, property and construction loans, you had a 52% rise in '05; '06, 41%; '07, 32%; way in excess of your competitors in Bank of Ireland, which were 23%, 23% and 22%, virtually ... significantly less. And, looking at it, that even with Anglo in 2005, you had 52% of an increase and you had ... Anglo...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Well, except, Mr. Sheehy, it made you-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Correct, I accept that, but generally.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: And how do you view that in the context that you were so exposed to property that it has meant that €20 billion of taxpayers' money has ended up going into AIB? And you're on record as saying that you'd rather die than take equity.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Twenty billion euro of taxpayers' money gone into AIB.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: As a result of this jumping, we'll say, into property and at such a rapid rate.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Can I just move on to the guarantee? And you made reference to your quote that the ... it's on AIB C3b, Vol. 2, page 29, which is the minutes of the Department of Finance. And you said: "People we've been dealing with for decades pulling back. One month we would be funding bank overnight. Bad if it can't even get that disaster bankruptcy." Are you disowning that statement?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: Had ye a liquidity problem? Did AIB-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: And are you saying AIB did not have a solvency problem on the night of the guarantee?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: And on the night of the guarantee did AIB go in with a guarantee, I suppose, an outline, a draft of a guarantee?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Kieran O'Donnell: What was the outline of that? What was the outline of your guarantee you were looking for?