Results 7,661-7,680 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, Mr. Walsh, can I ask you ... you said in retrospect, but may I press you in relation to your own position? I mean, you were not an untutored novice arriving at a board. You're a distinguished academic and you were professor of banking at UCD. What is your academic background, just in very brief terms?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: For some decades in any case.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can I suggest Mr. Walsh, or ask you why you wouldn't be aware - theoretically but also from practical experience of history - of the dangers here? For example, Professor Honohan, the former Governor of the Central Bank, in an article in the Economic and Social Review, summer 2009 says as follows, "A very simple warning sign used by most regulators to identify a bank exposed to increased risk...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: But Mr. Walsh, with respect, the society was involved in highly speculative activity. KPMG, its own auditors, referred to, you know, the speculative land developments. And, for example, you got a letter in 2003 from the regulator expressing concern on the growing concentration in property and development land. And then by September 2008, 80% of your loan book was in commercial property,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Now should you again, above all, have realised that this was ... that no property boom goes exponentially onwards without collapsing? And by the way, there were people, as you know ... we had evidence here where in 2003, David McWilliams very accurately predicted what was going to happen. I am wondering why, as an academic, you couldn't see this.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, the Project Harmony, which was a due diligence report that you'd be familiar with in 2007 doing the ... examining the society up to the end of 2006, found a concentration of loans in the higher risk development sector at 41% of total commercial lending. Concentration of loans in higher loan-to-value, 30% of commercial loans had higher than 100% loan-to-value and 30 commercial...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Except that you should have known that, by the laws of finance, capital and the way capitalism works, that what goes up comes down, but I think we've explored that somewhat. Can I ask you, moving forward-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, just on the subject of demutualisation, and that was one of the key reasons why you were brought onto the board, and Nyberg says that the drive to demutualisation was a very important factor in the years that you were there. In your opinion, did the desire of management to maximise the value of Irish Nationwide for demutualisation result in the adoption of poor lending practices...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, just on another issue, towards the end of 2009, according to Mr. Stanley Purcell, who comes later in the afternoon, Ernst and Young began an investigation into legacy issues at INBS. I am quoting from his statement: I gave [Ernst and Young] every assistance. The investigation ultimately led to the initiation of legal proceedings against the 'old Board' for the losses of the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: And was there a settlement?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can you tell us what the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, well that's what I want, is the process. I mean, Mr. Purcell says that he had to pay to the State a sum of money, which is confidential, but can you tell me the general terms of the settlement, as far as you are concerned?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Let me just say, Chairman, for a parliamentary inquiry not to be ... If four directors have to make a settlement and one director says that they paid a sum of money to the State as part of the settlement in regard to their governance of Irish Nationwide, and a parliamentary inquiry is not enabled to explore that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, Chair, but the point is if there is a settlement, if at least one person does say, of the four individuals concerned, that they paid a sum of money, it would indicate that there were issues there in relation to the governance during their period.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: That's the point I'm putting to Mr. Walsh.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, finally, two very brief points or questions. Thejournal.ie, in an article on Tuesday, 12 February 2013, said as follows: Con Power ... , who sat on the INBS board between 2000 and 2006, noted how there were just six people including himself on the board and meetings would normally begin with the chairman asking Fingleton [That's Mr. Michael Fingleton]: “Well Michael, what...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. In the book called Fingers, in relation to Mr. Fingleton, in relation to yourself, they're speculating about your reasons for being on the board, "Whatever his reasoning, [Walsh] Mr. Walsh [that's yourself] would later tell friends that getting involved with a toxic society was his greatest regret in an otherwise distinguished career." Would you just comment on those two last...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, I've just one issue I want to put briefly to you, and it's based on the book Fingers: The Man Who Brought Down Irish Nationwide and Cost Us €5.4 Bnby Tom Lyons and Richard Curran. It says that on 22 September 2008, that you met Mr. David Doyle, the then Secretary General of the Department of Finance. Did that meeting take place?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: The managing director being Mr. Fingleton.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Did the ... is the following then accurate or not? I quote: Walsh [you, Mr. Walsh] made his strongest argument in favour of a merger with Anglo Irish. This was the plan he had already privately discussed with its chief executive, Seán FitzPatrick, a close friend for twenty years. Anglo Irish, Walsh said, already knew many of Irish Nationwide's clients and had the expertise to manage...