Results 6,941-6,960 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Considine. Mr. Considine, you were on the board of the Central Bank of Ireland from 2002 to 2006. Over that period, from your observations and experience, do you think that board members had the knowledge and expertise necessary to judge on the macro-financial stability matters that arose?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But there were more overall facts as well, Mr. Considine, particularly with relation to the rapid growth in the banks. Can I quote to you from the then Governor, or at a later time Governor of the Central Bank, Patrick Honohan, in the report that he did into the banking crisis, page 217:A very simple warning sign used by most regulators to identify a bank exposed to increased risk is rapid...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, I heard you saying it first time, Mr. Considine.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, I mean, Mr. Considine, you were a long, long time in around finance issues. You must have been aware, for example, of the Scandinavian banking crisis in the 80s and into the 90s based on speculation, property, and massive over-lending by the banks. Would that not have caused you, and indeed other board members, to fear and to understand indeed, that the same could happen here?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Considine, there were voices from early in the 2000s, loudly raised, warning of the dangers. Did that not make any impact on people like yourself?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thanks, Mr. Considine. Some people would say that notwithstanding the international storm that the ... there was sufficient elements within the Irish situation for a blow-up and a crash in any case but I want to move on-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Considine, was the Department of Finance ever asked to undertake studies on the effects of the strong credit growth of the Irish banks, the effect that that might have on financial stability generally?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: I ... I have no doubt that other Deputies will get on to that, Mr. Considine, but just ... I know you did ongoing monitoring etc., but that there was no specific request to the Department in relation to a very rapid growth in the banks in your time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, can I move on to a different thing. John Hurley was Governor of the Central Bank in your time, yes? In his opening statement, on page 12, he said, "I was not aware of contrarian views within the Central Bank, which differed in substance from the Bank's overall assessment." And again said, "Views, which set out a different risk assessment, were not made known to me or to the Board in...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. Now we've done that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Considine, with respect, was there any serious debate inside the board, for example, where one or two members, for example, were arguing strongly about serious dangers and that that made a mark-up on you and other members? Did that happen?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, thank you for that. And then, Mr. Considine, within your own Department ... in recent years, newspaper reports emerged that there were a number of people who had a very seriously different approach and were attempting to raise red flags about a property crash, for example, housing crash, etc., in the middle of the 2000s. Were you aware of this?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, for example, Mr. Considine, there was an allegation that in relation to answering parliamentary questions, etc., when there were shock warnings of the extent of the credit growth, the property market and the danger of a crash, that the official or officials concerned were instructed to change that. Is that true?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Right. Move on again so, Mr. Considine. The Regling and Watson and indeed many other reports and individuals highlighted the over-exposure of banks to commercial property, including land and development sites. Was your Department aware of the risks as they emerged or as that ... the speculation and so forth intensifies and were any steps taken in relation to that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Could I turn then ... a continuation in some senses of ... of this question, to Vol. 1 of your core evidence document. And that's page 155 which is DOF and then 001. It's the ... a letter from the Irish Auctioneers and Valuers Institute to Mr. Charlie McCreevy TD, Minister for Finance. That should come up on the screen.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: You have it there yes?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: And then if ... so it's the auctioneers association lobbying the Minister for Finance in June 2003 and we then turn to page 157.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Page 157 now, we can ... if ... can that come up on the screen now as well?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: It's 003-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (17 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, and I just want to refer to four, "The IAVI recommends consolidation of the legislation surrounding compulsory purchase rights, but is strenuously opposed to any amendment to the fundamental principle of compensation being open market value.", and they are talking about land here. Can we go to the next page then please on the screen? Sorry, two pages down, page 159. Just the next one,...