Results 6,901-6,920 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. O'Reilly this is the premier agency bringing big business, finance etc. into the State. They say that as a matter of policy you had disapplied the regulatory system.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: You were conflicted by that were you?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. O'Reilly, when I was ... in relation to that and the follow on and the consequence of that, when I was researching for your appearance today, I wanted to find out that ship of fools referred to and Wikipediatells me that it's an allegory originating with Plato. It depicts a vessel without a pilot, populated by human inhabitants who are, among other things, oblivious and seemingly...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Right and last point, briefly, Mr. O'Reilly-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Six members of your board were also on the Central Bank board, isn't that correct?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: And they had a majority in fact.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: They didn't have a majority in the board.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay but it was a substantial component.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: So can I just ask you a new-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. Can I just ask you in your time there, was there any one or two or three board members who were expressing, say, a serious opposition to the general light-touch regulation that would have made a mark on you?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Patterson, could you explain to us the link between the micro-prudential regulation for individual institutions, how that then led to sector analysis and to ... how that fed into macroeconomic analysis for the Central Bank itself?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: And this found its way to the board then?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: The boards.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. And can I therefore take you again to Vol. 2, page 3? Deputy Doherty already referred to this and from a meeting in 2004, April-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: I'm allowed to quote, aren't I?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, its-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. So, let me just rehearse it again that: "X reported under Financial Stability Matters on recent discussions at the boards of the [Central Bank] and [the regulator]".

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. So, presumably, this is then an analysis of the information that has been fed in from the banks and the regulator looking into the banks. Okay, X then suggested that the Central Bank "had not convinced market participants that there may be "systemic risk" [that's in inverted commas, suggesting that that's the very word that was used] building up in the banking sector" and "indicated...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (11 Jun 2015)

Joe Higgins: And would agree, therefore ... or would you agree as well, Mr. Patterson, that the next sentence "X outlined a work programme including a "roadshow" designed to convince the bank boards of the "rationale to curb lending" no [direct] regulatory action was [recommended]." Would you agree that that is an enormous contrast to the seriousness of what went before? And would you agree that it is,...