Results 6,741-6,760 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Horan, in September 2008, were you involved in any discussions in the Central Bank, or regulator, in relation to the potential insolvency of any financial institutions?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: There was reference this morning about a high-level meeting on 26 September, where the Taoiseach, the Minister for Finance, the Governor of the Central Bank and others attended, and there is a question comes out of that as to whether two particular institutions were insolvent at that time. Were you aware of any of that discussion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: No, you don't need to refer to it-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----just take my word for it.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: No, no you don't need to, Mr. Horan. I am just saying that, as a matter of fact, we have evidence of a high-level meeting and there is questions arising form the minutes of that as to whether two particular institutions were insolvent or not at that time. I'm just asking you if you were aware of that discussion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Did you have a view on 29 September as to whether any of the banks were insolvent with the advantage of the position you had?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Mr. Horan, following the legislation of 2003 in relation to the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, the memorandum of understanding between the Central Bank and the regulator dealt with the responsibilities of both sectors, if you will. Do you think there was clarity on which ... what was the responsibilities of the Central Bank, on the one hand, and the regulator, on the other?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: So, would you believe or not that the board of the Central Bank, therefore, retained a serious responsibility in relation to financial stability arising from what the regulator was in charge of?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: And, are you aware that that's a direct contradiction of what the former Governor of the Central Bank told the inquiry?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Was it significant that six or seven members of the financial authority board were also members, and, in fact, constituted a majority of members, of the Central Bank board?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: That was your understanding?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Can I refer you then quickly to your statement ... written statement, page 4. And in reference to why so-called principles-based regulation and you refer to the IMF calling it light-touch regulation, why that was the case ... and you make reference to: The ... Board was, however, concerned about generating instability and the risks attaching to shrill warnings. It also had concerns...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. In other words, this concern that regulatory intervention might damage competitiveness, might perhaps affect the IFSC, which was a subject of discussion with Mary Burke ... is it that those minutes that you have footnoted here refer to that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. So the prudential information that was getting through to the board on a regular basis, which you said-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, I am-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Notwithstanding that, we still had this type of concern on the board about people who might be raising red flags about dangers in lending, etc.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (27 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. O'Neary, how would you describe ... background is that you were in banking supervision up to 2003. You became prudential director regulator in 2003 - a very senior position - and you were chief executive of the regulator in 2006. How would you describe your relationship with the banking institutions over that time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: And you referred in your opening to the need for trust, if I understood you correctly, between banks and regulator and you refer on a number of occasions that primary responsibility resided with the banks themselves for much of what they were doing. Mr. Neary, why should you trust the banks? I mean, you're a person more or less of my own generation. Do you not remember in 1984 the scandal...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (28 May 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, Mr. Neary, financial institutions have manifestly betrayed any trust previously which you were well aware of. Mr. Neary, were you a regulator who may have done well in the staid world of Irish banking in the 1950s but were you totally at sea in the cutthroat world of the capitalist financial markets in 2005, for example, whichThe New York Timesdescribed Ireland as the "Wild West of...